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4.1  Introduction 
This paper attempts to further our knowledge of the sources of value 
creation and destruction in acquisitions. Prior work by  economists con- 
sists primarily of large sample studies that provide mixed, incomplete, and 
sometimes conflicting evidence. Furthermore, these studies typically do 
not attempt to identify the organizational mechanisms and management 
practices that affect changes in productivity and performance. 
In this paper, we  ask two questions. First, when, how, and why  is value 
created or destroyed in mergers and acquisitions? Second, how well  do 
large sample performance measures reflect the underlying economics of ac- 
quisitions? To answer these questions, we  present clinical analyses of two 
acquisitions: Cooper Industries’ acquisition of  Cameron Iron Works in 
1989 and Premark’s acquisition of Florida Tile (formally known as Sikes 
Corporation)  in  1990. These  acquisitions  were  selected  because  they 
received very different stock price responses at the time of their announce- 
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ment-Cooper  Industries’ acquisition was viewed  positively, while Pre- 
mark’s acquisition  of  Florida  Tile  was  viewed  negatively. Despite the 
different market reactions, neither acquisition ultimately created value. In 
exploring the reasons for these negative outcomes, we  rely  primarily on 
interviews with managers and on internally generated (and nonpublic) 
performance data. We compare the results of these analyses to those from 
analyses of postacquisition operating and stock price performance tradi- 
tionally applied to large samples. 
Taken together, our analyses of these two acquisitions suggest the fol- 
lowing. First, it is very difficult to implement a value-creating acquisition 
strategy (and run an effective internal capital market). In both cases, post- 
acquisition difficulties resulted from three circumstances: 
1. Managers of the acquiring company did not deeply understand the 
target company. Despite the fact that Cooper Industries had operations in 
Cameron Iron Work’s industry (the petroleum equipment business), Coo- 
per’s management did not understand that its expertise in manufacturing 
technology and internal control would not translate into success for Cam- 
eron. As Cameron managers described it, Cooper did not understand that 
“Cameron was  not a manufacturing business. It was  a service business 
with a manufacturing component.” Similarly, Premark managers recog- 
nized only after the fact that they did not have sufficient expertise in Flor- 
ida Tile’s business. At the time of the acquisition, they viewed Florida Tile 
as an expansion of their decorative products division. As Premark’s chief 
executive officer (CEO) Jim Ringler noted, “[Wlhat we  learned [from the 
Florida Tile acquisition] is that no matter how simple a business appears, 
it is complex in its execution.” 
2. An inappropriate organizational design was imposed on the target as 
part of the postacquisition integration process. After the acquisition, Coo- 
per implemented its standard organizational structures and control proce- 
dures at Cameron. This process has been lionized as “Cooperization” in 
the popular press and in a widely taught corporate strategy case on Coo- 
per (Collis and Stuart 1991 ;  Collis 1991). Cooperization was inefficient for 
Cameron’s business and, we hypothesize, ultimately for Cooper as a whole. 
For Cameron, it created an overcentralized, highly bureaucratic organiza- 
tion that stifled innovation and motivation. In July 1995, Cooper split off 
its  energy-related  businesses, including Cameron,  creating a  new  firm 
called Cooper Cameron. Following the split, Cooper Cameron’s new man- 
agement team redesigned the organization and implemented new control 
procedures and  incentive compensation  plans. Many of  these changes 
effectively undid  Cooperization  and  appear  largely responsible for the 
split-off’s outstanding performance. Premark made Florida Tile part of 
its decorative products division and then essentially managed Florida Tile 
from headquarters. Premark also made no major changes in Florida Tile’s 
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Florida Tile’s operations was responsible for Premark’s slow response to 
production problems at Florida Tile. 
3. Inappropriate management incentives existed at both the top man- 
agement and division levels. After Cameron was acquired, Cooper imple- 
mented its standard incentive compensation system. Described by Cam- 
eron executives as “mysterious,” divisional executives asserted they did not 
know what determined their compensation. Similarly, Premark’s compen- 
sation system did not tie compensation to performance in any significant 
way.  In fact, Premark’s governance process and capital budgeting system 
actually encouraged managers to spend free cash flow rather than return 
it to shareholders. 
It is worth emphasizing that in both cases, managers of acquiring firms 
expected synergies from the acquisition because the businesses were seen 
as related. While there is considerable disagreement as to whether mergers 
create value in general (which we describe below), there is something of a 
consensus that combinations of related companies can realize synergies 
and are, therefore, more valuable than unrelated combinations. These two 
cases, however, provide counterexamples that illustrate the difficulty of 
realizing synergies even when managers have the best of intentions. We hy- 
pothesize that potential synergies are often illusive and sometimes mythi- 
cal in  organizations; they  appear as possibilities but  never  materialize 
either because they are difficult to achieve or because they never actually 
existed. 
A second conclusion we  draw from our analyses is that standard mea- 
sures of operating performance used in large sample studies are weakly, if 
at all, correlated with actual postacquisition operating performance. Stan- 
dard large sample measures of operating performance-company  changes 
in operating margins and operating return on assets-indicate  incorrectly 
that both the Cooper and Premark acquisitions were successful. 
We  argue that while neither acquisition created value, the initial stock 
market reaction to the acquisitions at the time were arguably reasonable. 
The market reacted positively to Cooper’s acquisition of Cameron because 
the two firms appeared  to operate in the same industry and there was 
an expectation that overlapping functions could be eliminated. Moreover, 
Cooper had a multidecade-long track record of making successful acquisi- 
tions (see Collis and Stuart 1991). In contrast, the market reacted nega- 
tively to Premark’s acquisition of Florida Tile because the market under- 
stood that Premark had substantial free cash flow from its Tupperware 
division, and management provided no concrete explanation of how Flor- 
ida Tile would add value to the organization. In addition, the acquisition 
would divert management’s attention from Tupperware, its primary busi- 
ness, which was deteriorating. 
We also discuss the biases that our research design uncovered and that 
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four candidate  acquisitions  to participate  in this  study. Two  turned  us 
down  immediately-one  was a poor  performer,  the other had a  long- 
standing nondisclosure  policy. Another firm  agreed  to participate  and 
then was only mildly cooperative. Only one candidate participated, and 
even their participation was limited to target management. In this sense, 
our sample is selected or biased. 
We  believe that such selection bias is unavoidable in clinical research 
and teaching case studies. Thus, it is important to place clinical evidence 
in the context of the large sample literature. While clinical research likely 
suffers from some bias, its strength is that it facilitates the study of phe- 
nomena that cannot be examined through large sample approaches, for 
example, research into the structural models underlying the phenomenon 
in question. It also has the potential to identify important factors that 
might then be studied in large sample contexts. Thus, the two lines of em- 
pirical work are complementary. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 4.2, we both summarize the 
existing (large sample) evidence on mergers and acquisitions and discuss 
the omissions in that literature. In section 4.3, we  discuss our research 
design and sample selection. In this section, we also illustrate some of the 
biases that affect clinical or case-based research. In section 4.4, we analyze 
Cooper Industries’ acquisition of Cameron Iron Works. In section 4.5, we 
analyze Premark’s acquisition of Florida Tile. For both acquisitions, we 
discuss the motivations for the acquisitions, detail the acquisitions’ effects 
on operating performance and the sources of value creation and destruc- 
tion, and perform both a traditional operating performance analysis and 
longer-term  stock performance analysis. In section 4.6, we  discuss our 
conclusions, the generalizability of those conclusions, and their implica- 
tions for future research. 
4.2  Existing Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions (and Lack Thereof) 
The existing evidence on the effects of mergers and acquisitions comes 
from two basic types of large sample studies: event studies and perfor- 
mance studies. Event studies consistently find positive average combined 
returns to acquirer and target stockholders around the announcement of 
an acquisition. This suggests that the market anticipates that acquisitions 
will create value on average. These studies (and reactions) do not, however, 
provide deep insight  into the  sources of  value changes  in  mergers, or 
whether those market expectations are ultimately realized. Furthermore, 
the combined returns cover a broad range of responses from very positive 
to very negative. 
Cross-sectional analyses of event-period returns provide some evidence 
that the broad range of combined announcement-period returns reflects 
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Mitchell and Lehn (1990) and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that there 
is a relation between (1) acquirer and combined returns and (2) the ulti- 
mate outcome of the acquisition. Mitchell and Lehn find that acquirers 
earning low returns are subsequently more likely to become the target of 
a hostile takeover bid. Similarly, Kaplan and Weisbach find that both low 
acquirer and combined returns are associated with an increased likelihood 
of  subsequent divestiture at a loss to the acquirer. Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny  (1  990) find  that  acquirer returns  are greater  in  acquisitions in 
which the acquirer and the target are in the same line of business. Other 
studies examine a number of different determinants of the cross-sectional 
variation in returns associated with  acquisitions (e.g., Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling  1991; Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell  1993; and Servaes 
1991). 
While cross-sectional analyses of event-period returns provide insight 
into the nature of the market reaction to acquisition announcements, they 
do not examine whether the anticipated value creation or improved pro- 
ductivity materializes. Nor do they have a great deal to say about the or- 
ganizational mechanisms and management practices that drive acquisition 
success or failure. 
Performance studies attempt to measure the longer-term implications 
of mergers and acquisitions. These studies use both accounting and stock 
return data to measure performance. Independent of the type of data ana- 
lyzed, these studies fail to find consistent evidence of  improved perfor- 
mance or productivity gains. For example, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
(1  992) study the postmerger operating performance of fifty large mergers 
completed in the early 1980s. Although they document an increase in re- 
turn on the market value of assets, Healy et al. find no evidence of changes 
in operating margins or capital expenditures. Similarly, Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987) find no evidence of margin improvements in a large sample 
of acquisitions completed in the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, Lichtenberg 
(1992) reports evidence of productivity improvements at the plant level for 
a sample of acquisitions in the 1970s. Studies that focus on acquirers’  long- 
term stock performance also find mixed results: abnormally negative stock 
returns  after the acquisition (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker  1992), no 
abnormal returns (Franks, Harris, and Titman 1991), and negative abnor- 
mal returns only for stock mergers (Mitchell and Stafford 1996). Like the 
announcement-period event studies, longer-term performance and event 
studies document  substantial cross-sectional variation  in  performance. 
But  again, they do not  provide deep insight into the sources of  value 
changes in mergers and acquisitions. 
Also relevant to this paper is a growing literature that attempts to ex- 
plain overall merger activity by documenting aggregate, institutional, and 
industry trends in acquisitions (see e.g., Jensen 1993; Comment and Jarrell 
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While these studies link acquisition activity to legal, regulatory, industry, 
or technological changes, they do not study whether these acquisitions 
achieve their objectives or meet the market’s expectations. 
We also surveyed the relevant literature in the field of corporate strategy 
and discussed that literature with our strategy colleagues. Again, we  found 
no study that examined the link between the outcomes of acquisitions and 
organizational strategy and structure. 
In sum, the voluminous economics, finance, and strategy literatures on 
takeovers during the past twenty years offer little insight to practitioners 
or academics on what managers do to influence whether mergers succeed 
or fail. Prior clinical work, such as Baker and Wruck (1989) and Wruck 
(1994), documents a connection between value creation and the nature of 
a firm’s governance structure, organizational design, and compensation 
systems. However, these studies examine firms undertaking highly lever- 
aged transactions, not mergers and acquisitions. 
4.3  Research Design and Sample Selection 
We  chose candidate sample firms from a sample of mergers and acqui- 
sitions created by  the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at 
the University of Chicago. The sample includes all firms delisted from 
the CRSP database between 1955 and 1995. We restricted our sample to ac- 
quisitions that were completed between 1987 and 1994. We began with 1987 
because we  wanted the acquisition to be sufficiently fresh in the minds 
of  the executives we  interviewed. We  ended with  1994 to ensure that at 
least two years had elapsed since the acquisition. Because we  were  inter- 
ested only in acquisitions by nonfinancial firms, we  eliminated acquisitions 
by financial firms. 
We  then  ranked  acquisitions based  on the  market’s announcement- 
period response. We  classified the reaction as positive if  the combined 
value of the acquirer and target increased by more than 5 percent (net of 
the return on the S&P 500) over the eleven days around the announce- 
ment. In these cases, the market anticipated that the value of the two com- 
panies in combination exceeded their stand-alone values. We classified the 
reaction as negative if  the bidder’s stock declined by  more than the in- 
crease in the target’s stock. In these cases, the market anticipated that the 
combination would destroy value. 
This ranking process generated thirty-four positive candidates and four- 
teen negative candidates. We then approached two positive and two nega- 
tive candidates, based on geographical proximity and school connections 
to executives at the acquirer. We  approached each of the four companies 
by telephoning and/or writing a letter to the CEO or other top manager to 
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tioned the contact who had referred us to the company. These contacts in- 
cluded two directors, the development office at one of the author’s schools, 
and an alumnus of one of the author’s schools. The acquisitions are 
1.  American Home Products’ 1994 acquisition of American Cyanamid. 
The acquisition had announcement-period returns (three- and eleven-day) 
of -$122  million and  -$lo8  million to American Home Products, and 
$2.65 billion  and $2.81 billion  to American Cyanamid. The combined 
value increase was $2.53 billion and $2.70 billion from an initial value of 
American Cyanamid of $5.52 billion. 
2.  Cooper Industries’ 1989 acquisition of  Cameron Iron Works. The 
acquisition had announcement period returns (three- and eleven-day) of 
$1 13 million and $207 million to Cooper, and -$13  million and -$8  mil- 
lion to Cameron. The combined value increase was $100 million and $199 
million from an initial value of Cameron of $703 million.’ Cooper Indus- 
tries also acquired Champion Spark Plugs in  1989. This acquisition had 
announcement period returns (three- and eleven-day) of -$34  million and 
$5 million to Cooper, and $166 million and $254 million to Champion. 
The combined value increase was $132 million and $259 million from an 
initial value of Champion of $556 million. 
3.  Maytag’s 1988 acquisition of  Chicago Pacific. The acquisition had 
announcement period returns (three- and eleven-day) of -  $175 million 
and -$195  million to Maytag, and $165 million and $167 million to Chi- 
cago Pacific. The combined value change was -$I0  million and -$28  mil- 
lion from an initial value of Chicago Pacific of $518 million. 
4.  Premark International’s 1990 acquisition of Sikes Corporation. Sikes 
Corporation’s primary operating unit was Florida Tile. The acquisition 
had announcement period returns (three- and eleven-day) of -$48  million 
and -$183  million to Premark, and $29 million and $30 million to Sikes. 
The combined value change was -$19  million and -$153  million from an 
initial value of Sikes of $103 million. 
American Home Products turned us down immediately. The vice presi- 
dent we  contacted explained that American Home Products has a long- 
standing policy of not participating in such projects. This outcome is con- 
sistent with the experience of several colleagues who have attempted to 
study this company. 
Cooper Industries made two acquisitions we  were interested in study- 
ing. Cooper Industries, however, did not want to participate. As men- 
tioned above, in 1995 Cooper Industries split off Cooper Cameron, which 
1. This understates the value increase in this acquisition. As described in section 4.4, Cam- 
eron’s share price had risen substantially several months earlier when its largest shareholder 
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included the remaining assets of Cameron Iron Works. Cooper Industries’ 
CEO suggested that we contact Cooper Cameron and Cooper Cameron’s 
top management agreed to participate. 
Maytag turned us down immediately. An assistant to the CEO stated 
that  the acquisition of  Chicago Pacific had been  an extremely painful 
chapter in Maytag’s history. Maytag had spent years undoing the damage 
that had been done by the acquisition. Subsequently, we  learned that the 
Wall Street Journal had written an extremely critical front-page story on 
the acquisition (31 January 1991). 
Premark agreed to participate. We  met with the CEO and the chief fi- 
nancial officer (CFO) for one afternoon at Premark’s headquarters.  At 
that time, they agreed to proceed with the project and provide us  with 
more detailed information.  Several weeks after this meeting, Premark’s 
CFO informed us that the company did not wish to continue its participa- 
tion. Accordingly, our analysis of this acquisition relies on publicly avail- 
able data and our one on-site meeting. Although we were unable to con- 
duct as detailed an analysis as we  originally anticipated, our findings are 
of interest and lend support to our conclusions. 
To ensure the integrity of the research, we  asked the firms to agree that 
they would not dictate the analysis or conclusions, but would have the 
right to review the information we  published for factual accuracy and for 
sensitive competitive information. 
Our experience in obtaining the sample makes clear that clinical and 
case-based research is subject to selection biases. We strongly suspect that 
firms with negative performance, such as Maytag, are less likely to partici- 
pate. Even Cooper Industries, whose CEO was extremely helpful to us, 
did not want to participate  directly. Both these organizations cited the 
counterproductive effects of revisiting the past  as important factors in 
reaching their decision. In addition, firms with nondisclosure or nonpar- 
ticipation policies are not potential research sites even when they do well, 
as was the case with American Home Products. Finally, we  found that our 
access to firms was easier when we (as individuals or through our institu- 
tion) had management contacts. 
Although we are not sure what the effect of these biases is on our paper, 
we  feel it is important to report them. It is also important to point out 
that biases arose in spite of the fact that we  attempted to minimize them 
through our sample selection method. As stated earlier, a critical part of 
the value of  clinical work is  to identify important phenomena that  are 
unlikely to emerge from large sample studies. Once identified, it is possible 
to study those phenomena more broadly in a larger sample context. How- 
ever, the potential for biases in clinical work makes it essential that these 
biases  be  identified  so  that  particular  firms  and  transactions  can  be 
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4.4  Cooper Industries’ Acquisition of Cameron Iron Works 
4.4.1  Company Descriptions 
In 1988, the year before the Cameron acquisition, Cooper Industries 
had sales of $4.25 billion and operating cash flow (also referred to as earn- 
ings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, or EBITDA) 
of  $610 million. The company operated in three segments. The largest- 
electrical and electronics-generated  more than  half  of  Cooper’s sales 
and operating profits. Its products included power transmission and distri- 
bution systems, lighting products, wire and cable, and protective electri- 
cal equipment. Cooper entered this segment with its 1981 acquisition of 
Crouse-Hinds. The second segment-Cooper’s  commercial and industrial 
segment-included  hand tool, window treatment, and automotive busi- 
nesses. It generated roughly 30 percent of sales and operating profits. The 
third segment-compression,  drilling, and energy equipment business- 
generated roughly 20 percent of sales and 10 percent of operating profit. 
This segment’s performance was the most highly variable and had been 
hurt by  the collapse of the energy market in the early 1980s. As recently 
as 1981, it had generated more than half of Cooper’s sales and operating 
profits. 
Based on reported SIC codes, this acquisition would be considered un- 
related using Compustat primary SIC codes, CRSP primary SIC codes, 
and Value Line industry classifications, but related at the three-digit level 
using the primary and secondary SIC codes listed in Dun and Bradstreet’s 
Million Dollar  Directory. Compustat  lists  Cooper Industries’ primary 
four-digit SIC code as 3640 (electrical wiring and lighting equipment). In 
contrast, CRSP assigns Cooper a four-digit SIC code of 351 1 (steam, gas, 
and hydraulic turbines). In the year before the Cameron acquisition, Dun 
and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory listed Cooper with a primary 
SIC code of  3469 (metal stamping), and secondary SIC codes of  3646 
(commercial  and  industrial  electric  lighting  fixtures),  3643  (current- 
carrying wiring devices), 361 3 (switchgear and switchboard applications), 
3679 (electronic components), and 3625 (relays and industrial controls). 
The Value Line Investment Survey includes Cooper in the electrical equip- 
ment industry. 
Cameron Iron Works had two operating divisions. The larger of  the 
two, the Oil Tool  Division, manufactured  “pressure control equipment 
used at the wellhead in the drilling for and production of oil and gas, both 
onshore and offshore.”2  The Oil Tool Division had sales of $428.7 million 
and EBITDA of $50.7 million in 1989. The smaller division, Forged Prod- 
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ucts, made forged and extruded metal products, some of which were sold 
to the Oil Tool Division. The Forged Products Division had sales of $182.3 
million and EBITDA of $19.3 million in  1989. 
Compustat assigns Cameron a primary four-digit SIC code of 3533 (oil 
and gas field machinery and equipment). Again, in contrast, CRSP assigns 
Cameron a four-digit SIC code of 3462 (iron and steel forging). Dun and 
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory lists Cameron with a primary SIC 
code of 3533, and secondary codes of 3462,3494 (values and pipe fittings), 
and  5084  (wholesale industrial  machinery and equipment) in  the year 
prior to the acquisition. Value Line includes Cameron in the oilfield ser- 
vices industry. 
4.4.2  Acquisition Motivation and Events 
At the time of the acquisition, Cooper’s Energy Services division manu- 
factured large compressors that pushed natural gas through pipelines and 
pumped  oil out of  the ground. Cameron had  operated in related busi- 
nesses since its founding in 1921. The potential for synergies with Cooper’s 
energy businesses and the opportunity to improve efficiency through con- 
solidation and cost-cutting made Cameron an attractive takeover target to 
Cooper. Cooper and Cameron sold to many of the same customers, and 
Cameron had a strong brand name and a reputation  for technological 
excellence and high quality products. 
Cameron became a likely acquisition candidate on 3 March 1989, when 
Cameron Iron Works’ largest shareholder, the Robinson Family Trusts, 
announced its intention to sell its interests in Cameron or sell the company 
as a whole. The trusts, which were owned and controlled by the family of 
Cameron’s founder, held 47.5 percent of Cameron’s common stock. The 
founder’s daughter owned an additional 7.5 percent of the company. On 
16 March  1989, Cameron announced  that it had held  a special board 
meeting and had authorized its financial advisors to consider alternatives 
that included selling the company. 
Cameron’s investment bankers, First Boston and Goldman Sachs, con- 
tacted 126 potential buyers for Camer~n.~  Ultimately, 5 of these buyers sub- 
mitted bids. The bids were discussed and evaluated by  Cameron’s board 
of  directors and Cooper’s was  chosen as the winner. On 24  July  1989, 
the  Wall Street Journal reported that Cameron and Cooper had entered 
into negotiations concerning a merger of the two companies. On 1 August 
1989, Cooper and  Cameron announced  that they had  signed a merger 
agreement. 
The acquisition of Cameron by Cooper Industries was completed on 28 
November  1989. The acquisition was structured as a tax-free exchange 
3. This section is based on conversations with John Deakins, Cameron’s CFO before the 
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of Cooper Industries’ preferred stock for Cameron’s common stock. In 
addition to acquiring Cameron’s equity, valued at $7 10 million, Cooper 
also assumed $257 million of Cameron debt resulting in a total transaction 
value of $967 million. 
Cooper Industries’ firm value at the end of the year before the acquisi- 
tion was $2.7 billion. Thus the acquisition increased Cooper’s size by  over 
one-third. In its 1989 annual report, Cooper provided this optimistic as- 
sessment of the acquisition: “[The Cameron oil tool business] operations 
complement Cooper’s existing valve  and  wellhead  business. There are 
many opportunities to combine marketing and distribution and to reduce 
costs even further, although Cameron’s management had done an excel- 
lent job of cutting operating costs. This acquisition puts Cooper in a very 
strong position to benefit from an expected upturn in the energy markets.” 
4.4.3 
This section and those that follow rely on both publicly available infor- 
mation-particularly  Collis and Stuart (1 99 l), Collis (1 991), and Keller 
(1983)-and  out interviews with William Berger, vice president of finance 
and  administration,  the  Cameron  division  of  Cooper  Cameron;  Joe 
Chamberlain,  Cooper  Cameron’s  corporate  controller;  She1  Erikson, 
Cooper  Cameron’s  CEO;  Thomas Hix,  Cooper  Cameron’s  CFO;  and 
James Deakins, Cameron Iron Works’ CFO. The four Cooper Cameron 
executives worked for Cooper Cameron at the time of the interviews in Au- 
gust 1996. Both Berger and Chamberlain had worked for Cooper Indust- 
ries for many years before the acquisition. John Deakins was Cameron’s 
CFO at the time of the acquisition and had joined Cameron in the 1970s. 
The Evolution of Cooper’s  Acquisition Strategy 
For Cooper, Cameron Iron Works was the latest in a long series of ac- 
quisitions resulting from an acquisition program that began in the 1960s 
and accelerated in the late  1970s and early  1980s. Table 4.1 presents a 
history of Cooper’s profitability and size from 1960 to 1995. In 1960, Coo- 
per’s firm value was $36.8 million; sales were $61.4 million. Over the next 
three decades, Cooper made more than forty acquisitions (as well as over 
thirty divestitures) of firms in related industries. Its value increased 213- 
fold, while revenues climbed 99 times and operating profit increased 173 
times. 
Cooper’s substantial increase in size was in large part due to its aggres- 
sive acquisition strategy, which was rooted in its history. Since its found- 
ing, the company had maintained a strong presence in the manufacture of 
heavy equipment for energy-related applications. The high volatility of 
cash flows from these energy-related applications led to what managers 
described as “low quality” earnings. To address this “problem,” Cooper’s 
management decided to use acquisitions both as a source of growth and 
Cooper’s Acquisition Strategy and Cooperization Table 4.1  Cooper Industries’ History of Profitability, Sales, and Assets, Fiscal Years 196lL199S  (in millions of dollars) 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1991  1995 
Sales 
Operating profit before depreciation 
Net income 




Five-year increase in firm value (“A) 
Five-year stock return (%) 
Five-year return to S&P 500 (YO) 
61.4  118.5  225.7  478.1  1,836.7 
6.2  17.5  32.1  76.9  347.0 
3.0  7.0  31.1  12.4  146.7 
0.35  0.56  0.35  0.76  1.07 
45.9  61.6  183.9  369.2  1,613.4 
6.4  NA  238.3 
36.8  90.8  173.7  310.4  1,880.6 
146.7  91.3  78.7  505.9 
103.6  50.1  84.5  433.0 





















6,155.3  4,848.7 
1,080.5  810.6 
393.2  94.0 
7,148.6  6,063.9 
2,543.8  2,226.0 
7,902.8  5,829.8 
4.0 
98.7 
3.04  2.51 
-26.2 
Note: NA = not available. Data items are taken from Compustat and Cooper Industries Annual Reports. 
“Adjusted for subsequent stock splits. Between  1960 and 1995, Cooper lndustries had four 2-for-1 splits occurring on 4 November  1966, 26 March  1976, 
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to provide a hedge against the operating risk associated with Cooper’s 
large investment in the energy sector. This strategy was articulated in a late 
1950s memo from Gene Miller, the first nonfamily president of Cooper, to 
corporate officers and division managers: 
Over the long term, our basic corporate objective is growth. Specifically, 
it is a rate of growth that will increase earnings per share (before tax) at 
a compound annual rate of 11 percent. Growth by itself, however, will 
not be sufficient. We must also improve the quality of earnings by reduc- 
ing the fluctuations of income that have characterized our company in 
the past. Stability of earnings, therefore, represent a collateral objective. 
This objective implies a careful examination of opportunities in  less 
cyclical and countercyclical areas as well  as a continuing effort to ex- 
pand  our  current  businesses. We  will  have  achieved  stability along 
with growth when our earnings in any one year never fall below those 
of the previous year. 
There are two reasons why  the achievement of these objectives is es- 
sential. First, the resulting earnings performance will ensure an above- 
average return on shareholders’ investment, in terms of dividend income 
and increased market value of Cooper shares. Second, the growth inher- 
ent in this performance is  necessary to provide the opportunities for 
individual growth and development that will  enable us to attract and 
hold high talent personnel. (Keller 1983, 140) 
Robert Cizik, who became Cooper’s CEO in 1969 and led the company 
as chairman and CEO until  1996, refined Cooper’s acquisition strategy. 
The company established three criteria for identifying potential acquisi- 
tions: (1) the companies should be in industries in which Cooper could be- 
come a major player; (2) the companies should be in relatively stable, low- 
tech manufacturing industries; and (3) only companies with leading mar- 
ket  positions should be considered. Cooper looked for companies with 
strong brand name recognition and strong marketing programs. Family 
owned and operated businesses were often attractive candidates because 
they offered the possibility of value creation through an infusion of capital 
and the addition of Cooper’s management expertise. Cooper pursued both 
complementary business acquisitions that would build upon established 
product lines and diversifying acquisitions that would put “another leg on 
the stool” of the company. 
In a  1977 address, Cizik described the principles underlying Cooper’s 
diversification program  (which remained an integral part of  the firm’s 
strategy well into the 1990s): 
In general, our diversification program has been very selective, carried 
out at a methodical and deliberate pace. . . . My point is that on every 
occasion, top corporate management controlled each major move. No 
move was made unless it offered Cooper the opportunity to become a 
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New diversifications were never attempted until earlier ones were thor- 
oughly understood and under control. 
. . .  Diversification is the means by which an organization is preserved 
and  temporal  resources  are  replaced.  As  management  strives  to 
strengthen and adapt the organization  to changing economic condi- 
tions, markets and environments, untapped talents and capacities will 
emerge, creating opportunities for expansion into new areas. By diversi- 
fying into new products and subsequently exploiting new markets, ac- 
quiring new facilities, and infusing new blood into its organization, a 
company can restore depleting resources. Diversification is the natural 
outcome of foresight and the instinct to survive in a changing world, 
and it is made possible through the wise use of financial assets, or more 
specifically, cash. 
. . . Throughout its existence, an organization  must  deal with  the 
challenge created by the cash flow cycle-that  is, cash into the business 
and cash out of the business. It must continually search for sources of 
funds and opportunities for investment. In a very real sense, its health 
and survival depends on its success in  these searches. If  a company 
cannot finance its growth, financially stronger competitors will relegate 
it to the corporate backwaters. Similarly, a mature company that fails 
to translate today’s cash into tomorrow’s profits will decay. The latter 
problem can be solved in part through diversification. When businesses 
are combined, those with cash flow surpluses can feed those with a need 
for cash. Later, as investments made in one line of business come to 
fruition  and opportunities  emerge in  another, their  roles can be re- 
versed. 
. . . In  my  opinion, it  is  not a question  of whether  diversification 
should occur, but rather how much and in what direction. (Keller 1983, 
242) 
Through the late 1970s, Cooper’s acquisitions were relatively small. The 
company concentrated on building what it called its “toolbasket,” making 
a series of acquisitions in the hand tool industry that included Ken-Tool 
Manufacturing, Lufkin Rule, Cresent Niagara, Nicholson  File, Xcelite, 
and J. Wiss & Sons (Keller 1983). The firm also assembled an aircraft ser- 
vices segment in addition to its petroleum-related compression and dril- 
ling segment. 
With its May 1979 acquisition of Gardner-Denver, however, Cooper’s 
acquisition strategy changed. Gardner-Denver was about the same size as 
Cooper, with revenues of $642 million versus Cooper’s $780 million. In 
addition, Gardner-Denver operated in the cyclical energy business, man- 
ufacturing  machinery  for  petroleum  exploration  and mining.  Because 
Gardner-Denver was perceived to be poorly managed and in a related 
business, Cooper management saw it as an attractive target. 
Less than two years later, in  November  1980, Cooper made a white 
knight tender offer for Crouse Hinds, which was in the midst of a takeover 
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roughly equal in size to both Cooper and Gardner-Denver prior to the 
acquisitions. Crouse-Hinds produced electrical plugs, receptacles, and in- 
dustrial lighting, and was itself in the process of acquiring Belden, an elec- 
trical wire, cable, and cord producer. The acquisition of Crouse-Hinds 
represented a new business segment for Cooper. After 1980, Cooper con- 
tinued acquiring both smaller and larger companies. McGraw-Edison (ac- 
quired in  1985 for $1.1 billion) and Champion  Spark Plug (acquired in 
1989 for $800 million) were the two largest of these. 
Integrating Acquisitions: Cooperization 
In conjunction with its acquisition strategy, Cooper’s management had 
developed a systematic approach for absorbing newly acquired companies 
that became  known both internally and  externally as “Cooperization.” 
Cooper and Cooperization became the subject of two well-known teach- 
ing cases. The earlier of the two, Piper (1974), focuses on Cooper’s 1972 
acquisition of the Nicholson File Company, which was part of its strategy 
to assemble a strong presence in the nonpowered hand tool industry. The 
latter, Collis and Stuart (199 l), addresses Cooper’s acquisition strategy 
and its purchase of Champion Spark Plug and Cameron Iron Works. Both 
cases present Cooper as a successful acquirer and strong performer. In 
fact, Collis (1991) goes so far as to say that for the only time in his course, 
he is willing to make a normative statement: “Cooper is a great company.” 
Collis also notes that “Cooper is a wonderful example of a large, success- 
ful and diversified company which has grown through acquisition, but re- 
mains fundamentally an operating company.” He bases this conclusion 
on the fact that Cooper’s stock price performance cumulated over several 
decades outperforms the S&P 500 and on his assessment that Cooper’s 
strategy is internally consistent. As we  show later, analysis utilizing more 
appropriate performance measures and our qualitative organizational evi- 
dence provides strong evidence to the contrary for the Cameron acqui- 
sition. 
Overview of Cooperization. Following an acquisition, Cooper implemented 
its manufacturing practices and accounting and control systems at the 
target firm. Cooper did not become heavily involved in the strategy or 
marketing aspects of acquired businesses. Instead,  they selected target 
firms based in large part on the strength of target management teams in 
these areas. In our visit to Cooper Cameron, William Berger, formerly 
with Cooper Industries, now vice president of finance and administration 
for the Cameron division of Cooper Cameron, described Cooperization 
as follows: 
In my view, Cooperization was comprised of the following: (1) leave the 
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Cooper managers; (2) revamp  the financial reporting  structure; and 
(3) put in Cooper’s fundamental management and control policies and 
procedures. The Cooperization process was a process of internalizing 
management control systems and accounting systems. It was  not in- 
tended to change product market strategies or even to understand them 
at first. That knowledge came over time. 
Cooper would always find ways to get cash out of a company. They 
implemented new working capital management practices; found market 
niches; implemented better  product  pricing  structures;  stripped  out 
product lines that had become fixtures in the organization, but weren’t 
carrying their weight; consolidated fragmented businesses when part of 
an acquired business fit with something they already owned-they  put 
the two together and reduced administrative and overhead costs. 
The impetus didn’t come because Cooper management was expert in 
the businesses they acquired. It came from taking a fresh look at the 
acquired business, a willingness to infuse capital, and asking manage- 
ment a lot of questions about why  things were the way  they were. For 
example, why  do we make this product? Why are we in this business? 
This characterization of Cooperization is consistent with the one in Col- 
lis and Stuart (1991) and with our readings of analyst reports. 
Manufacturing Services. Manufacturing improvement was an important 
part  of  Cooperization. To  this end, Cooper headquarters maintained a 
manufacturing services group of roughly fifteen professionals to provide 
management and consulting services to new acquisitions as well as to ex- 
isting units of the firm. Furthermore, the manufacturing services group 
oversaw Cooper’s capital budget (Collis and Stuart 1991). Cooper invested 
heavily in the companies it acquired both to improve manufacturing pro- 
cesses and to bring financial reporting and control practices up to speed. 
Manufacturing services focused on eliminating weak “old fixture” prod- 
uct lines, improving product pricing structures, consolidating operations 
where it found synergies with existing businesses, and reducing spending 
on perquisites. The slogan “Cash is king” became an integral part of each 
target’s working vocabulary. In addition  to being held  accountable for 
profitability, managers were  encouraged to  utilize working capital  effi- 
ciently through a system that charged them interest on its use. 
Joe Chamberlain, who had worked on Cooper’s acquisitions and divest- 
itures as a controller at Cooper, elaborated: “Cooper bought businesses 
where they manufactured something. It was the job of  the senior vice- 
president of the manufacturing services group to oversee the implementa- 
tion of modern manufacturing technology in  acquired firms. Cooper in- 
vested in  businesses that hadn’t had a whole lot invested in them. They 
put lots of money into businesses that couldn’t afford it. Cooper also put 
in modern control systems, The idea was that the combination of modern 
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tremendous cash flow  that would repay the debt from the acquisitions. 
Then they could do it all over again.” 
Because of this heavy involvement with and investment in manufactur- 
ing, Cooper became known as one of the leaders of American manufac- 
turing. For example, Cizik was named outstanding chief executive in the 
machinery industry in both 1980 and 1981, and was president of the Na- 
tional Association of Manufacturers in 1993. 
Accounting and  Control Systems.  Following an acquisition, Cooper in- 
vested in the target’s accounting and control systems to make them consis- 
tent with Cooper’s systems. In addition, as part of its implementation of 
the purchase method of accounting for acquisitions, Cooper headquarters 
established and managed reserve accounts for each target firm. Consistent 
with  purchase  accounting,  Cooper  routinely  estimated  liabilities  that 
would be incurred as part of the Cooperization process. These included 
anticipated expenditures required to revamp facilities, shut down parts of 
operations, and perform necessary maintenance. The anticipated liabili- 
ties were credited to “other long-term liabilities.” The offsetting debit was 
to “goodwill.” Because goodwill is  amortized over forty years, this ac- 
counting treatment  allowed Cooper to spend heavily  on improvements 
soon after the acquisition without a concomitant  reduction in reported 
earnings. Berger commented: “Cooper was on the leading edge of technol- 
ogy with respect to acquisition accounting. For example, in 1990, after the 
Cameron acquisition they set up reserves for people who were on the pay- 
roll today that would be terminated under  restructuring. Their salaries 
from January 1 through their termination were  put in the reserve.” Both 
Berger and Chamberlain viewed Cooper’s purchase accounting practices 
as motivated by management’s desire to deliver consistent growth in earn- 
ings per share to shareholders. 
Cooper’s aggressive approach to purchase accounting is reflected in the 
growth of intangible assets on the firm’s balance sheet from $6.4 million 
in  1970 to $238.3 million in  1980 and $2,609.5 million in 1990. The off- 
setting entries are reflected in the growth of  liability accounts (not pre- 
sented in table 4.1). As intangible assets increased, so did split-adjusted 
earnings per share (EPS) from $0.35 in 1970 to $1.07 in 1980. EPS did dip 
to $0.70 in 1985, a poor year for the energy business, but bounced back, 
reaching $2.81 in 1990. 
Evaluating the Success of  Cooperization before the Cameron Acquisition. 
Based on Cooper’s stock performance, Cooper’s acquisition strategy was 
arguably a success through the time of the Cameron acquisition. Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 present  Cooper’s stock  performance  (including dividends) 
from 1970 to 1995 and from 1980 to 1995, respectively. Figure 4.1 com- 
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Fig. 4.2  Cooper Industries long-term stock performance, 1980-95 
stock, the S&P 500, and an equal-weighted portfolio of stocks listed on 
CRSP as having an SIC code of 35 1  1,  Cooper’s primary SIC code at the 
start of the period. The figure indicates that from 1970 to 1989-the  year 
of the Cameron acquisition-Cooper  outperformed both its industry and 
the S&P 500.4 
Figure 4.2 measures Cooper’s performance from the beginning of  1980 
to 1995 relative to the S&P 500, and to an equal-weighted portfolio of 
4. We use the term arguably at the start of the paragraph because these comparisons and 
the ones that follow are not based on statistical tests. Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions  197 
stocks listed by  CRSP as having SIC codes of  3511 and 3640. (Crouse- 
Hinds had a CRSP SIC code of  3640.) The beginning of  1980 is chosen 
because it marks the start of the period in which Cooper began to make 
substantially larger acquisitions. The figure indicates that from  1980 to 
1989, Cooper underperformed the S&P 500. This underperformance, how- 
ever, appears to have been driven by  the poor performance of Cooper’s 
two primary industries. During this period, Cooper outperformed both 
industry indices by a substantial margin. 
4.4.4  Initial Market Reaction to the Cameron Acquisition 
Table 4.2 presents the stock price response of Cooper and Cameron 
shareholders to events associated with the merger for a three-day window 
centered on the announcement  date and the corresponding eleven-day 
window. Performance is  based on market-model abnormal  returns  and 
their associated abnormal dollar value. Both companies’ market value in- 
creased at the merger announcement. Our estimate of the market’s expec- 
tation of  the total value created by  Cooper’s acquisition of  Cameron is 
$300 million based on the three-day window and $352.8 million based on 
the eleven-day window. 
For Cameron’s shareholders, the abnormal dollar value across all events 
totals $188.2 million measured during the three-day window and $146.1 
million measured during the eleven-day window.  Most of  this value in- 
crease occurred around the first indications that the firm would be sold, 
both when the Robinson Family trusts announced their intention to sell 
and when Cameron’s board held its special meeting on 16 March 1989. It 
is worth adding that these abnormal returns imply that Cameron’s capital 
value without the acquisition would have been roughly $800 million, $779 
million, or $821 million, based on Cameron’s capital value in the acquisi- 
tion of $967 million. 
For Cooper’s shareholders, the abnormal dollar value across all events 
totals $1 12.8 million measured during the three-day window and $206.7 
million measured during the eleven-day window.  Most of this value ac- 
crued when the two companies signed a merger agreement. For the three 
days around 24  July  1989, when Cooper and Cameron announced they 
were negotiating, Cooper’s share price fell by  a significant 4.42 percent; 
the corresponding value decline was $148.1 million. Roughly one week 
later, on 1 August 1989, when the merger agreement was signed, Cooper’s 
abnormal return was a significant 8.04 percent for the three-day and 10.92 
percent for the eleven-day window.  The corresponding abnormal dollar 
values were $260.9 million and $356.1 million, respectively. 
The market’s positive reaction is consistent with the hypothesis that in- 
vestors expect the past  success of Cooper’s acquisition strategy to con- 
tinue. In fact, several analyst reports at the time describing the acquisition 
made this argument. Table 4.2  Stock Price Response to Events Associated with Cooper Industries’ Acquisition of Cameron Iron Works (millions of dollars) 
Days -  1 through 1  Days -5  through 5 
Cooper Industries  Cameron Iron Works  Cooper Industries  Cameron Iron Works 
Common Stock  Common Stock  Common Stock  Common Stock 
Total  Total 
YO  Abnormal  Abnormal  YO  Abnormal  Abnormal  Abnormal  YO  Abnormal  Abnormal  YO  Abnormal  Abnormal  Abnormal 
Event Description (Date)  Return  Dollars  Return  Dollars  Dollars  Return  Dollars  Return  Dollars  Dollars 
Robinson Family Trust 
files a 13-D discussing 
the possibility of 
selling their shares 
(3/3/89)  15.97  85.0  85.0  15.29  77.8  77.8 
Cameron holds special 
board meeting to 
consider alternatives, 
including selling the 
company (3/16/89) 
authorizes financial 
advisors to explore 
alternatives (4/5/89) 
Cameron and Cooper 
announce they have 
Cameron’s board 
13.25  81.0  81.0  8.39  49.4  49.4 
4.94  34.2  34.2  9.03  60.1  60.1 
entered into 
negotiations (7/24/89)  -  4.42  -148.1  2.19  15.1  -133.0  -0.31  -  10.2  1.23  8.7  -1.5 
sign a merger 
agreement (8/1/89)  8.04  260.9  -1.26  -28.1  232.8  10.92  356.1  -3.89  -15.4  340.7 
Total abnormal dollars  112.8  188.2  300.0  206.7  146.1  352.8 
Cameron and Cooper 
Note: Abnormal returns are computed based  on market models estimates from days -200  through  -21  prior to the first announcement for both Cooper 
Industries and Cameron Iron Works. Abnormal dollars for eleven-day windows are not additive because of window overlap. Value  Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions  199 
4.4.5 
All of the measures of productivity change associated with Cooper’s ac- 
quisition of Cameron that we  consider indicate that the combination was 
unsuccessful. As mentioned earlier, a little over five years after the acquisi- 
tion, Cooper divested Cameron and three other energy-related divisions 
through a tax free split-off transactionlexchange offer in which Cooper’s 
shareholders could exchange Cooper shares for shares in the new Cooper 
Cameron. The new company, Cooper Cameron Corporation, consisted of 
Cameron (Cooper Oil Tools), Cooper Energy Services (Cooper’s original 
energy-related business), Cooper Turbocompressor, and Wheeling Ma- 
chine Products. In connection with the split-off, Cooper recognized a $313 
million (accounting) charge or write-down. Immediately after the split-off, 
Cooper Cameron wrote down an additional $441 million. In accounting 
terms, therefore, the Cameron acquisition is associated with $441 million 
to $754 million in write-downs of a total purchase price of $967 million. 
To the extent that the write-downs reflect real losses, they imply realized 
capital values for Cameron of $213 to $526 million. These values are con- 
sistent with a substantial deterioration in Cameron’s value following the 
acquisition and/or substantial overpayment by Cooper. 
As we  discuss below, the qualitative and quantitative evidence we  have 
collected strongly corroborates the write-off data. We find that the acquisi- 
tion destroyed $400 to $500 million in value (relative to the initial value of 
$800 million). The Cooperization process failed to function effectively in 
integrating Cameron. In giving us his assessment of the Cameron acquisi- 
tion,  She1 Erikson, CEO of Cooper Cameron, argued: “The thing that 
hurt Cooper in its acquisition of Cameron was the lack of success of the 
‘Cooperization’ process.” In fact, given that Cooper is no longer an active 
acquirer, it appears that Cooperization might have failed not only in Cam- 
eron’s case, but more broadly as well. 
Our evidence in this section comes from one manager of (the preacquisi- 
tion) Cameron Iron Works and from several managers of Cooper Cam- 
eron. They provided us with a perspective on the preacquisition Cameron, 
the Cameron acquisition, the Cameron operations as a part of Cooper, 
and on the actions taken following the split-off to create value. The post- 
split-off actions are associated with  outstanding stock performance for 
Cooper Cameron shareholders. Figure 4.3 indicates that from the split- 
off date, 19 July 1995, through  1 October 1996, Cooper Cameron’s stock 
returned 160.3  percent. The corresponding return to the S&P 500 was 25.1 
percent. Cooper Cameron’s stock return also exceeded the return to other 
companies in its industry. Over the same period, firms in the Dow Jones 
Oil Equipment Services Index returned 37.2 percent. The return to Coo- 
per Cameron’s stock represents value creation of $388 ($890) million in 
1989 (1995) dollars, adjusted for industry performance. (This value cre- 
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ation includes both Cameron and Cooper Energy Services.) Thus, Coo- 
per’s  decision to  split off  Cooper Cameron  allowed  shareholders  that 
chose to retain the Cooper Cameron shares to recover some, but not all, 
of the value destroyed following the acquisition. 
The actions that led to Cooper Cameron’s stock performance provide 
indirect evidence on how value was destroyed while Cameron was part of 
Cooper: what the split-off managers choose to do differently when running 
a free-standing organization provides insight into how Cooper could have 
managed Cameron more effectively. 
As we  describe below  in  detail, the story we  heard from the Cooper 
Cameron managers was  that  the  Cooperization  process and  organiza- 
tional structures were inappropriate for Cameron. In addition, an increas- 
ing number of acquisition and divestiture transactions per year took more 
and more of top management’s time at Cooper, so less time was spent on 
operating and  strategic management issues. As this occurred, Cooper’s 
management systems were ineffective in addressing fundamental problems 
with leadership or strategy at Cameron. Finally, Cooper’s compensation 
system, which Cameron’s managers described as “mysterious,” failed to 
provide strong incentives. We  hypothesize that Cameron’s experience is 
consistent with the Cooperization process moving from an initially effec- 
tive system to an overly centralized and bureaucratic process that inhibited 
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Organizational Design 
Overcentralization and Bureaucratic Creep. Cooper’s organization of Cam- 
eron (and Cooper Energy Services) was overly centralized. As She1 Erik- 
son, Cooper Cameron’s CEO, explained, “Cooper organized Cameron 
functionally out of Houston as one profit center. The president of Cam- 
eron was accountable for those profits. This doesn’t put profit responsibil- 
ity where it is  best managed. Roughly two-thirds of Cameron’s business 
was outside the U.S. Yet under Cooper, people in the field had to get OKs 
from Houston. Obviously this was very time consuming.” 
Michael Grimes, president of Cooper Cameron’s Energy Systems Divi- 
sion who had recently joined the firm from General Electric Power  Sys- 
tems, concurred with  Erikson’s assessment. He noted  that Cooper had 
organized Cameron and Cooper Energy Services as “very tall functional 
chimneys with  lots of  layers within each chimney.”  This centralization 
made it difficult for sales executives in the field to obtain cooperation from 
operations executives in Houston. 
John Deakins, Cameron’s preacquisition CFO, provided independent 
corroboration of the view that Cooper was overly centralized relative to 
Cameron: “Cooper was forms oriented, while Cameron was people ori- 
ented.  Cameron  sold  big  ticket  items with  multi-million-dollar prices 
where  personal  relationships  mattered  while  Cooper  sold  more  com- 
modity-type products. Cooper’s style and culture were completely the op- 
posite of Cameron’s.’’ 
Consistent  with  the  excessive  centralization,  immediately  after  the 
split-off, Cooper Cameron’s new management reorganized both Cameron 
and Cooper Energy Services. According to Erikson, “We toyed with differ- 
ent organization concepts. We came up with a matrix. We  had three re- 
gions. . . . These regions were  matrixed against products. . . .”  This new 
organization  put  decisionmaking  closer to the  customer  and  allowed 
Cameron to manage regionally and by  product. 
At the same time that Cooper became overly centralized, it also appears 
to have become overly bureaucratized. As Berger explained: 
Part of the Cooperization process is to establish a consistent methodol- 
ogy of reporting financial performance. The idea was to gain manage- 
ment controlhnternal control over the business. This became an end 
unto itself rather than an effective way to run a business. 
In the final analysis, the Cooperization process went too far. By  the 
time Cooper had digested Champion and Cameron, managers were so 
concerned about control that it was difficult for divisions to make deci- 
sions. The internal control  process was overbearing. The amount of 
time we  spent on bureaucratic administration versus running the busi- 
ness was unbelievable. The internal controls were taken to a point where 
they hamstrung businesses and kept them from making decisions. That 
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changes without the bureaucracy associated with heavy internal con- 
trol. We had to unravel the bureaucracy that we had established through 
the Cooperization process. 
Grimes added,  “The management  control  system  in  this  organization 
[was] unbelievable. It was one of the first things I encountered. When I 
put in a $3,000 request for a laptop computer, it required ten signatures. 
This is a very control-oriented culture. . . . The first thing I did was to get 
the bureaucracy out by delayering. I didn’t want to redefine the processes 
to get the job done. We took reports out and layers out, but we  didn’t want 
to confuse people about the fundamentals of the business.” 
Chamberlain gave this story as an example of how the system took on 
a life of its own: 
One year, Cizik said to each of his seven direct reports that he wanted 
a monthly report on how  their business was doing. So each of  them 
requested a monthly report of their direct reports and so on. On aver- 
age, one or two days a month were spent generating a report telling us 
what we  were  doing all month. Each month, Cizik got a 70-80  page 
report from each of his direct reports. In the treasury department, they 
kept logs of our activities so we  could accurately report what we’d done. 
This is the kind of thing that happened. It’s the kind of thing that hap- 
pens in big companies when one man at the tops says “give me this.” 
There was a fear of asking the boss, “Is this what you want? Do you 
want this to happen?’ 
Cooper’s Manufacturing Services Group evaluated capital requests. 
All  of  the  requests  went  through  an extensive  process.  To  spend 
$600,000 for a machine tool you had to fill out a request that was 25 
pages long. It would be reviewed by  a bunch of  people. Then finally 
approved. The approval process took several weeks. We  [the new Coo- 
per Cameron] are trying to get it down to 2 to 3 pages, including a 
summary of the expected return. We  want to emphasize that the return 
is the most important thing. The new process takes two days at most. 
Preoccupation with Acquisition and Divestiture Transactions. As Cooper in- 
creased the size and number of acquisition and divestiture transactions, 
they became an increasingly large part of  activity at corporate headquar- 
ters. It appears that completing transactions successfully became as im- 
portant as or more important than whether the transactions were strong 
ones. Chamberlain explained: 
As viewed in hindsight, Cooper became too involved in acquisitions and 
divestitures-they  were doing seven to eight a year. Headquarters was 
focused on doing acquisitions and not on the process of managing busi- 
nesses. Acquisitions and divestitures chew up a tremendous amount of 
resources. Cooper tended to do all of the work internally. All aspects of 
the corporate office were involved in each acquisition and divestiture. 
Acquisitions were fun, more fun than running the business. At the end 
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acquire XYZ business and we  acquired it. What a great acquisition! 
Success was measured by  making acquisitions and divestitures. They 
didn’t have to be good. It was a failure if something we  wanted was for 
sale and we  didn’t get it. We started worrying about the next one before 
we had figured out what to do with this one. We did conduct postacqui- 
sition reviews, but the numbers were really soft because we would often 
be absorbing a new business and new products into our existing prod- 
uct lines. 
At Cooper Cameron, I feel like I see a lot more attention to what’s 
going on with the businesses. 
Inability  to  Understand  Business and  Confront  Strategy and  Leadership 
Problems. As described earlier, part of Cooper’s acquisition strategy was 
to acquire manufacturing businesses in related areas, invest resources to 
improve efficiency, cut costs, and implement modern management control 
systems. According to Cooper Cameron managers, this approach proved 
particularly unsuitable for Cameron. In Erikson’s view, Cooper misunder- 
stood the importance of manufacturing versus service and marketing in 
Cameron’s businesses. He explained: 
Cameron didn’t fit the Cooper style. There was a lack of understanding 
of what the oil field market was all about. Cooper was a manufacturing 
company. Bob Cizik was president of the National Association of Man- 
ufacturers. But this is not a manufacturing business. It is a service busi- 
ness with an equipment manufacturing component. Cooper missed the 
marketing and service side of the business, and the changes in this direc- 
tion that were taking place in the market. 
Cooper had an effective business strategy that was manufacturing ori- 
ented. It was not focused on the customer (and most of their products 
were sold through distributors). When it was running Cameron, Cooper 
was constantly trying to improve the manufacturing processes. 
Here is an example of a mistake they made. Cameron was a franchise 
business when  Cooper bought it. They changed its name to Cooper 
Oil Tools. This was wasteful. We  changed back to Cooper Cameron. 
Cooper did this because it was part of their strategy to call everything 
Cooper, and because they didn’t understand  that  our business was a 
service business. 
John Deakins also questioned whether Cooper understood  what it was 
buying in Cameron. “Not only did the nature of Cooper’s and Cameron’s 
businesses differ, but Cameron had already spent the greater part of the 
1980s improving quality and wringing out costs. I had worked for Cooper 
briefly in  1973 and greatly respected what they did in the area of quality 
and cost management. During the 1980s downturn, we instituted a quality 
management program and worked on reducing costs. Employment de- 
clined to 5,500 from 14,000 and we  wrung out 20 percent of our costs. I 
do not know that Cooper understood that we  had done that.” 
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that began in 1992. Its poor performance during this period significantly 
affected Cooper’s earnings. Management hired outside consultants to as- 
sess Cameron’s market position. Their report was unfavorable, stating that 
the  division  was  losing  market  share.  Cameron’s  president  disagreed, 
claiming that the performance was to be expected in light of business con- 
ditions, but that they were not losing share. Top management accepted 
the division manager’s analysis. Berger described the situation: 
The two years following the acquisition were great. Around the time of 
the Gulf War, business started to fall off dramatically. In August 1992, 
orders fell away. They did not recover until early to mid-1995. But in 
1992, we  were still profitable. In 1993 we  broke even. In 1994, we  lost 
significant dollars. It was virtually a disaster. In response, we did a lot 
of consolidation. We went from 6,500 employees in  1991 to 4,200 em- 
ployees in 1995. 
Cooper knew there were problems. Cameron was in a cycle headed 
into a trough and it was affecting Cooper’s earnings and stock price. At 
the 1993 annual meeting, Cizik talked about the company’s weak out- 
look. The stock price fell from $51 to $43 in a day. The rest of Cooper’s 
businesses were doing fine. 
Booz Allen was hired to do a market analysis of Cameron. In their 
report, Booz Allen concluded that we  were losing market share. The 
president of Cameron was able to discredit the Booz Allen report and 
convince Cizik and other top managers [incorrectly] that we hadn’t lost 
market share. There was no management or organizational response to 
the data from Booz Allen. But their data shouldn’t have been necessary. 
Our own financial statements provided us with data that there was a 
problem. 
Cameron’s management knew the market so well that we  [Cooper’s 
managers] had convinced ourselves that we could not find someone who 
knew the business like they did. They were always saying that perfor- 
mance was going to improve and they seemed to be taking the right 
actions. They convinced us that when the market rectified itself the per- 
formance was going to be there. All of us had the arrogance of the 
dominant competitor in the industry. We let competitors penetrate the 
low-tech end of the business. We  couldn’t respond as they were able 
to respond. We  weren’t focused on our competitors-we  were losing 
market share. 
Nine days after the split-off, Cameron’s president was let go. Follow- 
ing its split-off, Cooper Cameron changed its organizational structure 
to focus on customers and marketing rather than manufacturing. 
Compensation and Incentives 
Cooper used the Hay system of job classifications to set salary levels 
(Collis and Stuart 1991, 13). Under the Hay system, each job is assigned 
a number of points based on measures of job size, including number of 
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objective of the system is to allow cross-job comparisons that help the firm 
pay similar salaries to managers with similar jobs. At Cooper, manage- 
ment felt that the uniform pay scales resulting from the Hay system al- 
lowed managers to move easily between divisions. Unfortunately, the Hay 
system also creates incentives for managers to increase personnel and re- 
sources under their control. Taken in combination with Cooper’s strategy 
of growth through acquisition, managers arguably had a strong incentive 
to grow the firm beyond its optimal size.5  While empirically establishing 
the optimal size of an organization is not possible, our findings are consis- 
tent with the hypothesis that Cooper destroyed value, in part, by becoming 
“too large.” 
Cooper also paid bonuses that could reach 20  to 40 percent of  base 
salaries. The bonuses were determined by executives at headquarters. Col- 
lis and Stuart (199 1) emphasize Cooper’s Management Development and 
Planning (MD&P) system for evaluating key  managers. Under MD&P, 
managers developed detailed goals for the forthcoming year and then were 
evaluated on their attainment of those goals. “The program uncovered ex- 
isting or potential management gaps and identified people worthy of suc- 
cession” (Collis and Stuart 1991). 
In fact, the managers we spoke with did not understand Cooper’s com- 
pensation and incentivr: system and were critical of it. They felt Cooper’s 
bonus allocations were largely independent of performance-theirs  or the 
company’s-and  therefore provided little motivation for performance. A 
sample of comments concerning compensation at Cooper include the fol- 
lowing: 
Cooper described bonuses as discretionary, subject to a maximum- 
and they were. They were whatever they wanted to pay any individual. 
There is one word that best describes Cooper’s compensation system: 
mystery. It was an absolute mystery. I never knew why  my  salary was 
what it was. Bonuses were even more mysterious. There were two years 
where I got no bonus. I never knew why.  One year, I was managing a 
small part of the business and we had turned around performance from 
a $750 thousand loss to a $3 million gain. My incentive bonus that year 
was $6,500; I thought it should have been triple that. I scratched my 
head forever on the compensation issue. 
Cooper paid bonuses, but no one knew why they got what they got. It 
was kind of like getting a Christmas turkey. 
We  commiserated about it all the time. We  would cry on each other’s 
shoulders, we didn’t understand it. We put trust in the division president 
to get us a decent bonus. 
5. This issue is related to the more general problem of the trade-off between using promo- 
tions for incentives and to place individuals in the appropriate job, discussed in Baker, Jen- 
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It is difficult to argue that these comments are those of disgruntled em- 
ployees because the executives who made them did well  at Cooper and 
were consistently promoted. 
Immediately after the split-off from Cooper, Cooper Cameron adopted 
a very  different compensation philosophy that relied heavily on bonuses 
tied to objective performance goals (known by  employees) and equity- 
based compensation. Upon taking control, Erikson and Hix tied the com- 
pensation of their managers to EBITDA. Moreover, Erikson and Hix ar- 
ranged to be paid entirely in stock options. Erikson explained that “before 
Cooper Cameron was split off, Cooper did a search for someone to run 
the division. That was in October of  1994. I joined Cooper in January of 
1995. At that time I was still the CEO of a publicly traded company [The 
Western Company of North America] that we were in the process of sell- 
ing. Tom  Hix also came from The Western Company. When we  talked 
about compensation, I told them I wanted all options, no salary. That’s 
what I got. That’s Tom’s arrangement as well. Our board also takes only 
options for compensation.” Hix explained his compensation philosophy 
succinctly: “Compensation is the single most important thing in business. 
People will follow whatever path you’ve laid out. If you have a weak com- 
pensation system, you get what you deserve.” 
It is also possible to see the different emphases on incentives before and 
after the split-off by  comparing the equity ownership of top management 
at Cooper Industries and at Cooper Cameron. At the time of the split-off 
in  1995, Cooper’s directors and executive officers as a group owned di- 
rectly or through options approximately 0.76 percent  of the company’s 
stock. In contrast, Cooper Cameron directors and executive officers as a 
group owned stock and options for 4.87 percent of Cooper Cameron- 
1.89  percent directly or through vested options and an additional 2.98 per- 
cent in options that would vest by the year 2000. 
Informed Operating Performance 
In this section, we  analyze the success of Cooper’s acquisition of Cam- 
eron using financial data provided to us by  Cooper Cameron manage- 
ment. It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the performance of Coo- 
per’s acquisition of Cameron using publicly available data for two reasons. 
First, data are unavailable for 1990 and 1991 because Cooper did not re- 
port Cameron’s results separately. Second, while Cooper Cameron does 
report EBITDA (and capital expenditures) for Cameron’s segment from 
1992 to 1995, those data do not include Cooper’s expenditures out of “ac- 
quisition reserves.” 
Table 4.3  presents our analysis of Cameron’s operating performance be- 
fore and  after the acquisition. It indicates that  EBITDA to assets and 
EBITDA to sales declined significantly after the acquisition, both nomi- 
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Table 4.3  Informed Operating Performance for Cameron Acquisition 
EBITDA  EBITDA 
Assets  Sales 
A. Normal Operating Performance 
1984  0.025  0.041 
1985  0.084  0.127 
1986  0.081  0.112 
1987  0.042  0.066 
1988  0.034  0.051 
1989  0.093  0.113 
1990  0.089  0.091 
1991  0.088  0.081 
1992  0.103  0.080 
1993  -0.011  -0,010 
1994  -0.064  -0.071 
Average  0.041  0.034 
B. Industry-Adjusted Operating Performance 
Preacquisition 
Postacquisi  tion 
Preacquisition 
1984  -0.074  -0.119 
1985  -0.010  0.006 
1986  0.142  0.237 
1987  0.166  0.209 
1988  -0.003  -0.025 
1989  0.007  0.021 
1990  0.008  -0.042 
1991  -0.055  -0.020 
1992  0.027  0.000 
1993  -0.103  -0.129 
1994  -0.180  -0.212 
Postacquisition 
Average  -0.061  -0.081 
Note; Changes  and industry-adjusted  changes  in  operating  income before depreciation 
(EBITDA) to sales and assets for Cameron Iron Works and Cooper Oil Tools only, using 
information provided by Cooper Cameron. Industry-adjusted performance based on median 
performance of firms in Cameron’s Compustat primary SIC code of 3533. 
the industry-adjusted results are insensitive to the type of industry adjust- 
ment. Table 4.3 reports industry-adjusted results using the median perfor- 
mance of Compustat firms in Cameron’s primary Compustat SIC code of 
3533. We obtain similar, albeit slightly more negative, results using firms 
in the same Value Line industry. We  also obtain similar results when we 
restrict the industry controls to firms similar in size (as measured by as- 
sets) to Cameron. 
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Table 4.4  Market Value of Remaining Assets of Cameron as of 19 July 1995 
Market Value 
(Cooper Cameron) 
Total debt  375 
Equity  625 
Total  1,000 
Petroleum  Compression and 
Production  Power Equipment 
(Cameron)  Energy Services)  Cameron 
Equipment  (Cooper  o/o 
EBITDA  10.6 
Sales  562.7 
Assets  1,286.7 
90.2  10.5 
546.0  50.8 
319.9  77.2 
Note: Calculated using Cooper Cameron prospectus and CRSP stock prices. Values are in 
millions of dollars. 
all impact of  the Cameron acquisition on Cooper’s shareholders. To  do 
this, we  perform an analysis similar to that performed by Kaplan (1989a, 
1989b, 1994). The analysis is presented in tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. 
Table 4.4 reports that Cooper Cameron had an initial market value of 
total capital of $1 billion on 19 July 1995 when it was split off from Cooper 
Industries. It is not possible to assign a precise value to Cameron at this 
time because Cooper Cameron included Cameron as well as the assets of 
Cooper Energy Services. Table 4.4 also reports the EBITDA, sales, and 
assets of Cooper Cameron’s two segments for fiscal year 1994. The petro- 
leum production equipment (PPE) segment consisted largely of Cameron. 
As a percentage of the entire company, the PPE segment contributed  11 
percent of EBITDA, 51 percent of sales, and 77 percent of assets. Based on 
these percentages, we  assume, in what follows, that Cameron contributes 
50 percent of the value of Cooper Cameron. In other words, we  assume 
Cameron has a capital value of  $500 million on  19 July  1995. Because 
Cameron’s (book value) assets are the least reliable of  these figures, 50 
percent may overstate Cameron’s true value. 
Table 4.5 reports  the cash flows generated by  the assets of  Cameron 
from January  1990 through June 1995. The cash flows are measured as 
EBITDA less capital expenditures less the increase in net working capital 
plus the proceeds of asset sales. These cash flows differ from those that 
would be produced from Cameron’s (or Cooper’s) financial statements be- 
cause they include expenditures associated with the acquisition that Coo- 
per capitalized at the time of the acquisition and did not run through the 
income statement. It also is worth noting that these cash flows are before 
tax and, therefore, likely overstate the cash flows that would  have  been 
available to Cameron investors. 
Table 4.6 presents the estimated postacquisition market value of Cam- Table 4.5  Cameron Interim Cash Flows 
Period Ending 
12/90  12/91  12/92  12/93  12/94  6/95 
EBITDA  68.6  68.5  63.0  (6.6)  (38.4)  8.6 
Capital expenditures  (52.1)  (88.4)  (40.3)  (39.6)  (39.6)  (9.4) 
Cash flow in 
noncash working 
capital  10.2  10.0  74.9  (6.8)  6.3  40.5 
Total interim cash 
Asset sale proceeds  34.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  81.3  0.0 
flow  61.5  (9.9)  97.6  (53.0)  9.6  39.7 
Note; Interim cash flow equals EBITDA less purchases of property, plant, and equipment, 
plus the estimated cash from (used in) noncash working capital, plus asset sale proceeds. 
These cash flows include expenditures that Cooper capitalized at the parent level. The in- 
terim cash flows were provided from internal records by William Berger of Cooper Cameron. 
All values are in millions of dollars. 
Table 4.6  Postacquisition Value of Cameron Compared to Purchase Price 
Nominal  Industry-Adjusted  Market-  Adjusted 
Cash 
Flows  Nov. 1989  July 1995  Nov. 1989  July 1995 
Cameron’s postacquisition 
market value 
Interim cash flows”  145.5  92.8  212.6  120.3 
Value of remaining assetsb  500.0  218.2  500.0  261.4 
Total  645.5  311.0  712.6  381.7 
Price paid by  Cooper for 
Cameronc  967.4  961.4  2,217.2  967.4 
Implied premerger value of 
Camerond  821.3  821.3  1,882.4  821.3 







Overpayment by  Cooper‘  321.9  656.4  1,504.6  585.7  1,120.5 
-- 
Note; Nominal, industry-, and market-adjusted values of Cameron Iron Works postacquisition com- 
pared to acquisition value. Postacquisition value equals the sum of asset sales, interim cash flows, and 
the value of remaining Cameron assets. All values are in millions of dollars. 
Nominal value equals actual value. Industry-adjusted  (market-adjusted) values in November 1989 
equal the actual values discounted from the month in which they occur to 30 November 1989 by  the 
return on the equal weighted index of firms in Compustat with Cameron Iron Works SIC code of 3533 
(S&P 500). The industry- (or market-) adjusted values in July  1995 equal the actual values adjusted 
from the month in which they occur to July 1995 by  the return on the equal-weighted industry index 
(S&P 500) over that period. 
”Interim cash flows and asset sales are from table 4.5. Interim cash flows equal EBITDA less capital 
expenditures less the increase in net working capital plus the proceeds from asset sales. 
bThe  value of the remaining assets is based on table 4.4 and assumes that the Cameron assets constituted 
50 percent of the market value of Cooper Cameron. 
“Purchase price paid by Cooper is the sum of the market value paid for the equity and the book value 
of Cameron debt outstanding in November 1989. 
dImplied premerger value of Cameron is the purchase price paid by  Cooper less the abnormal return 
earned by Cameron shareholders of $146.1 million over the eleven-day window described in table 4.2. 
‘Value destroyed by Cooper equals Cameron’s implied premerger value less Cameron’s postacquisition 
value. 
‘Overpayment by  Cooper equals the price paid by Cooper less Cameron’s postacquisition vlaue. 210  Steven N. Kaplan, Mark L. Mitchell, and Karen H. Wruck 
eron and compares it to both the value paid by Cooper ($967 million) and 
the implied premerger value of Cameron ($82  1 million, which excludes 
the increases in Cameron’s stock price from announcements related to the 
acquisition using the eleven-day window). The table presents these values 
in nominal terms, industry-adjusted to November  1989 and July  1995, 
and market-adjusted to November 1989 and July 1995. The industry- and 
market-adjusted values are calculated by discounting (or growing) the in- 
terim cash flows and the value of the remaining assets by the returns on, 
respectively, an equal-weighted index of firms in Compustat with Cam- 
eron’s SIC code and the S&P 500. 
Table 4.6 indicates that in November  1989 dollars, Cooper realized a 
value of  only $382 million market-adjusted,  or $3 1 1 million  industry- 
adjusted, from its acquisition  of Cameron. Relative to the $967 million 
capital value that Cooper paid in November 1989, this represents an over- 
payment by  Cooper of $586 to $656 million. If we  use the implied pre- 
merger value, taking into consideration the $146 million premium Cooper 
paid to Cameron’s shareholders, we  estimate that the acquisition lost or 
destroyed $440 to $510 million in value. 
The results in table 4.6 accurately reflect the value realized by Cooper 
from its investment in Cameron as of the date of the split-off. These results 
also reflect the effects of Cooperization on Cameron. They do not reflect 
the total value or returns realized by  Cooper because Cooper retained a 
20 percent stake in Cooper Cameron after the split-off. As we  reported 
earlier, Cooper Cameron’s shares substantially outperformed the market 
after the split-oK Through  1 October 1996, Cooper Cameron’s stock in- 
creased in value by an industry-adjusted $388 million in 1989 dollars ($890 
million in 1995 dollars). Assuming that Cooper Energy Services and Cam- 
eron contributed equally to this increase in value, Cameron increased in 
value by  $194 million in 1989 dollars ($445 in 1995 dollars). Under this 
assumption, Cooper’s 20 percent stake increased Cooper’s value by  $39 
million in 1989 dollars, or less than 10 percent of the overall loss to Coo- 
per’s shareholders. 
4.4.6  Traditional Operating Performance 
As noted earlier, researchers typically measure performance using the 
ratios of EBITDA to both assets and sales. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
(1  992) introduce an additional performance measure that deflates by  the 
market value of the firm’s capital (the sum of market value of equity and 
book value of debt) rather than assets or sales. Before the acquisition, we 
obtain these ratios by adding the relevant variables for both the acquirer 
and the target. After the acquisition, we use the values for Cooper Indus- 
tries as a whole. 
We adjust for industry performance using the median performance of 
Compustat firms in Cameron’s primary Compustat SIC code of 3533 and 
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try performance by the appropriate relative amount of Cooper and Cam- 
eron assets, sales, or value. 
Panel A of table 4.7 presents operating performance variables for the 
combination of Cooper Industries and Cameron Iron Works from 1984 
to  1994. Panel  B  presents  the  industry-adjusted  results. The  industry- 
adjusted results are qualitatively similar using Value Line industry control 
Table 4.7  Traditional Operating Performance for Cameron Acquisition 
EBITDA  EBITDA  EBITDA 
Assets  Sales  Value 
A.  Nominal Operating Performance 
Preacquisitiona 
1984  0.112  0.124 
1985  0.113  0.140 
1986  0.129  0.136 
1987  0.116  0.130 
1988  0.124  0.134 
1989  0.114  0.149 
1990  0.149  0.172 
1991  0.151  0.176 
1992  0.127  0.154 
1993  0.141  0.161 
1994  0.116  0.163 
Average  0.137  0.165 
Postacquisitiona 
B. Industry-Adjusted Operating Performanceb 
Preacquisition" 
1984  -0.023  0.013 
1985  -0.014  0.029 
1986  -0.002  0.053 
1987  -0.011  0.042 
1988  -0.028  0.029 
1989  -0.034  0.042 
1990  0.027  0.072 
1991  0.032  0.087 
1992  -0.013  0.055 
1993  -0.004  0.064 
1994  -0.017  0.063 


























Note:  Changes and  industry-adjusted changes in  operating  income before depreciation 
(EBITDA) to sales, assets, and value for Cooper Industries' acquisition of Cameron Iron 
Works using publicly available data. 
'Preacquisition performance is  measured by  combining the performance of  Cooper and 
Cameron. Postacquisition performance is measured based on data from Cooper's financial 
statements. 
bIndustry-adjusted performance based on median performance of  firms in Cooper's and 
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firms and for industry- and size-matched control firms. The table indicates 
that  EBITDA to assets and EBITDA to sales increased after Cooper’s 
acquisition of Cameron, both nominally and adjusting for industry. This 
is completely at odds with the actual acquisition outcome described above. 
The EBITDA to value measure, in contrast, rises and then declines after 
the acquisition, successfully matching the pattern of actual acquisition re- 
sults. 
It is  worth adding here that our analysis uses  EBITDA reported  by 
Cooper Industries after the acquisition. As we noted earlier, this EBITDA 
overstates true EBITDA by a substantial amount because Cooper created 
liability accounts at the time of the acquisition for expenses that would 
otherwise have reduced EBITDA. For example, Cooper Cameron’s finan- 
cial statements report  changes in  other  assets and  liabilities of  -$48.6 
million and -$56.2  million in 1992 and 1993. Our internal data are consis- 
tent with this order of magnitude. 
4.4.7  Longer-Term Stock Performance 
From the time Cooper acquired Cameron until the split-off, as shown 
in fig. 4.2, Cooper’s stock underperformed both the S&P 500 and its two 
primary industries. Subsequent to the split-off (through 1 October 1996), 
Cooper continued to underperform  the S&P 500. This deterioration in 
stock performance coincides with the Cameron Iron Works acquisition 
and is consistent with the internal deterioration in organizational practices 
described earlier. 
Furthermore, following a downturn in oil prices in 1991, Cooper re- 
ported  poor  earnings due largely to the performance of Cameron and 
Cooper’s other oil tools businesses. These announcements generated an 
extremely strong, negative response from the market, the press, and finan- 
cial analysts. Cooper’s announcement that its 1991 earnings and sales in 
its petroleum and industrial segment would be off was greeted with a re- 
turn  17.8 percent below  the S&P 500 over the eleven surrounding days. 
Cizik’s announcement on 26 January 1994 that 1993 earnings would drop 
substantially because of a slump in the oil industry coincided with a Coo- 
per stock price decline of 21.2 percent relative to the S&P 500. Both de- 
clines are statistically significant. 
4.4.8 
Based on our clinical and quantitative analyses, we  conclude that Coo- 
per’s  acquisition of  Cameron destroyed value rather  than increasing it. 
Although Cameron operated in the same industry as one of Cooper’s divi- 
sions, Cameron’s business was substantially different from Cooper’s. The 
imposition of  Cooper’s centralized organizational design and incentives 
was particularly inappropriate for Cameron. Although the stock market 
initially responded positively to the acquisition of Cameron, in large part 
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because of Cooper’s past acquisition successes, Cooper’s stock price ulti- 
mately declined, reflecting the failure of the Cameron acquisition. 
We suspect that Cooperization failed more generally and that Cooper’s 
stock price decline has reflected that failure. While proving this suspicion 
or hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems hard to argue 
that Cooper’s acquisition strategy did not ultimately fail. 
4.5  Premark’s Acquisition of Florida Tile 
4.5.1  Company Descriptions 
In 1989, the year before the Florida Tile acquisition, Premark had sales 
of $2.6 billion and EBITDA of $231 million. Premark operated in three 
business segments: (1) The Tupperware division produced  plastic food 
storage and serving containers, and generated 40 percent and 56 percent, 
respectively, of Premark’s sales and operating profit in 1989. (2) The Food 
Equipment Group manufactured commercial food equipment, and gener- 
ated 36 percent and 12 percent, respectively, of Premark’s sales and op- 
erating profit in 1989. The Food Equipment Group consisted of the Ho- 
bart and Vulcan-Hart Corporations. (3) The Consumer and Decorative 
Products segment consisted of  the Decorative Products Group and the 
Consumer Products Group, and generated 24 percent and 32 percent, re- 
spectively, of Premark’s sales and operating profit in 1989. The Decorative 
Products Group included Ralph Wilson Plastics, which made decorative 
plastic laminates under the Wilsonart label, and Tibbal Flooring, which 
manufactured and sold oak flooring under the Hartco name. The Con- 
sumer Products Group included West Bend and Precor, which sold small 
electric appliances under the West Bend trademark and home physical fit- 
ness equipment under the Precor, West Bend, and Total Gym trademarks. 
West Bend also manufactured bathroom scales under the Borg trademark. 
Premark’s primary SIC code is listed as 3089 (plastic products) by Com- 
pustat, CRSP, and the Million Dollar Directory. The Million Dollar Di- 
rectory also lists Premark as operating in industries with SIC codes of 
3944 (games, toys, children’s vehicles, excluding dolls), 3589 (service in- 
dustry machinery), 3556 (food products machinery), 3596 (scales and bal- 
ances, excluding laboratories), and  3565 (packaging machinery). Value 
Line assigns Premark to its diversified industry classification. 
Florida Tile (Sikes Corporation) engaged “primarily in the business of 
manufacturing and selling glazed ceramic wall and floor tile for residential 
and commercial uses.”6  The company’s products were marketed under the 
Florida Tile brand name. In the fiscal year ending February 1989, Florida 
Tile had EBITDA of $23.9 million. 
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Florida Tile’s primary SIC code is listed as 3250 (structural clay prod- 
ucts) by  Compustat and as 3253 (ceramic wall and floor tile) by  both 
CRSP and the Million Dollar Directory. The Million Dollar Directory 
also lists Sikes as operating in industries with SIC codes of 5032 (brick 
and related construction material, wholesale) and 3544 (special dies, tools, 
and die sets). Florida Tile was not listed in Value Line. 
The SIC code listings indicate that this acquisition would be considered 
unrelated using the primary SIC codes in Compustat and CRSP. Using 
the Million Dollar Directory and the secondary SIC codes, the acquisition 
would be considered related at the two-digit level. 
4.5.2  Acquisition Motivation and Events 
Before the Florida Tile acquisition, Premark made one successful and 
two unsuccessful attempts to acquire firms in the decorative products in- 
dustry. Management viewed acquisitions in this area as synergistic with its 
prosperous laminate business, which was a part  of Wilson Plastics. In 
1988, Premark completed its first acquisition in this area when it acquired 
Hartco (Tibbal Flooring). In 1989, Premark attempted to buy American 
Olean, one of  the leading companies in the wall and floor tile business, 
but was outbid by Armstrong World Industries. In 1990, another tile com- 
pany, Dal Tile, was put up for sale. Again, Premark was unsuccessful in 
buying the company, losing out to a private equity fund, AEA. 
After missing out on two opportunities, Premark’s management told us 
they felt strongly at the time that they could not miss out again when 
Florida Tile put itself up for sale. James Ringler, Premark’s current CEO, 
recalled that “there was an organizational momentum that we had to do 
something. The momentum rolled right over the top of that thing.” 
On 12 September 1989, Florida Tile announced that it had received an 
informal and unsolicited expression of interest from a foreign company in 
the $190 to $200 million dollar range. On 16 October 1989, Florida Tile 
announced  that  it was seeking a buyer. In December, Florida  Tile an- 
nounced that it was still in the process of seeking a buyer. In February, a 
Lebanese investor group, Cerdbati, acquired a 5.4 percent stake in Florida 
Tile. Also in February, Florida Tile considered and turned down an offer 
from  a  French ceramic company. On 23  April  1990, Florida  Tile an- 
nounced an agreement to be acquired by  Premark. Premark paid $201 
million for Florida Tile’s equity and assumed $14 million in debt for a 
total price of $215 million. Premark’s firm value at the end of the year 
prior to the acquisition was $1.5 billion. The acquisition,  therefore, in- 
creased Premark’s firm value by only 14 percent. 
4.5.3  Premark’s Acquisition Strategy 
This section and those that follow rely on publicly available information 
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Larry Skatoff, Premark’s current  CFO. At the time of the transaction, 
James Ringler had just been hired as an executive vice president to run 
the non-Tupperware businesses. Larry Skatoff joined the firm in 199 1. At 
the time of the transaction, Warren Batts served as Premark’s CEO. 
As was the case with Cooper, it seems that Premark’s acquisition strat- 
egy was strongly influenced by  its history. Premark was created in  1989 
through a spin-off by Dart and Kraft. It comprised a hodgepodge of busi- 
nesses that did not fit with one another or with Dart and Kraft’s remaining 
businesses. According to Dart and Kraft’s 8-K describing the spin-off, the 
“lines of business to be assigned to Premark have not fully developed their 
potential” (see Schipper and Smith 1988). So rather than being the result 
of  a conscious diversification strategy, Premark’s combination  of  busi- 
nesses was the result of happenstance. At the time of the Florida Tile ac- 
quisition, according to Ringler, “Premark was a conglomerate with no spe- 
cific focus.” As we detail below, Premark’s acquisition strategy lacked focus 
as well. 
Premark’s acquisition strategy was to be a smart, opportunistic buyer. 
Ringler explained, “Tupperware was Premark’s cash cow. The issue was 
how  to redeploy the cash.” Inside the organization, distributing cash to 
shareholders either as a dividend or share repurchase was not viewed as a 
viable option. In fact, one or two years after the Florida Tile acquisition, 
Larry Skatoff made a presentation to the board of directors concerning a 
possible share repurchase. He felt his presentation “was not well received.” 
In his view, “the board viewed a repurchase as a cop out. It was something 
a weak management did when they could not think of  anything else to 
do.” This description of Premark’s approach to internal resource alloca- 
tion parallels the arguments by Jensen (1986) concerning the potential for 
value-destroying investment by organizations with free cash flow. 
Also as in the case of Cooper, Premark’s managers felt that growth was 
critical to the success of their organization. Ringler explained, “Our real 
issue is where to get growth in a mature industry. Managers are not in- 
terested in empire building or being bigger. To me, I don’t care whether 
my  company is $2 million in sales, $2.5 billion in sales, or even $5 billion 
in sales. The real issue is that managers live in constant fear that by  not 
growing or investing in the business it will stagnate and ultimately you 
will lose it. You  don’t want to lose the attributes that make you success- 
ful because the other guy does something and you don’t and that hurts 
At the request of top managers, executives in the corporate strategy area 
evaluated potential acquisitions and investments. After detailed research, 
the strategy group and Premark’s top management determined that addi- 
tional investment in the decorative products business would be attractive. 
This decision was reached at headquarters with little input from division 
managers but with strong support from an outside consulting firm. 
you.” Table 4.8  Stock Price Response to Events Associated with Premark’s Acquisition of SikeslFlorida Tile (millions of dollars) 
Days -1  through  1  Days -5  through 5 
Premark International  SikeslFlorida Tile  Premark International  SikeslFlorida Tile 
Common Stock  Common Stock  Common Stock  Common Stock 
Total  Total 
YO  Abnormal  Abnormal  YO  Abnormal  Abnormal  Abnormal  YO  Abnormal  Abnormal  YO  Abnormal  Abnormal  Abnormal 
Event Description (Date)  Return  Dollars  Return  Dollars  Dollars  Return  Dollars  Return  Dollars  Dollars 
Premark agrees to 
acquire Florida Tile 
for $201 million 
(4/23/90)  -5.95*  -48.4  28.50*  29.1  -19.3  -19.24*  -182.9  29.16*  30.1  -152.8 
Total abnormal dollars  -48.4  29.1  -19.3  -  182.9  30.1  -152.8 
Note: Abnormal returns are computed based on market models estimates from days -200  through  -21  prior to the first announcement for both Premark and 
SikeslFlorida Tile. Returns based on the excess of firm returns over the S&P 500 yield similar results. 
*Abnormal return is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test. Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions  217 
4.5.4  Initial Market Reaction to the Acquisition 
Table 4.8 presents the stock price response of Premark and SikedFlor- 
ida Tile shareholders to the merger for a three-day window from days -  1 
to 1, and an eleven-day window from days -  5 to 5. Again, performance is 
based on market-model abnormal returns and their associated abnormal 
dollar value.7  As a result of the merger, combined value decreased by $19.3 
million based on the three-day window and by $152.8 million based on the 
eleven-day window. Value increased for Florida Tile shareholders, while it 
declined for Premark’s shareholders. For Florida Tile shareholders, the 
abnormal dollar value totals $29.1 million measured during the three-day 
windows and $30.1 million measured during the eleven-day windows. The 
corresponding total value decreases for Premark’s shareholders are $48.4 
million and $1 82.9 million. 
According to Ringler, the acquisition and concomitant decline in Pre- 
mark’s  market  value  was  not  well  received  by  investors and  analysts. 
Shortly after the acquisition, he and Warren Batts, then CEO of Premark, 
went to New York to meet with a group of equity analysts. Ringler de- 
scribed their experience: “There were about 75 to 100 people there. They 
were  incredibly angry. They were  personally insulting to Warren. They 
asked questions like, ‘Are you as dumb as you look?’ It was as ugly a bus- 
iness session as I have ever been to. We decided that the primary Premark 
shareholder was a Tupperware-oriented person.  They were  buying be- 
cause they liked Tupperware. The other businesses were background pains 
that they had to tolerate.” 
The strong investor reaction ($183 million decline for a $215 million 
acquisition) is consistent both with (1) their expectation that the Florida 
Tile would be unsuccessful, and (2) their mounting frustration over Pre- 
mark’s decision not to distribute free cash flow to its shareholders and an 
expectation that Premark would  continue to make poor decisions con- 
cerning how to allocate that free cash flow. Large sample evidence in Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling (1991) also finds that acquirer shareholders react neg- 
atively to acquisitions by acquirers with high free cash flow. In the eyes of 
Premark executives, the market reaction to the Florida Tile acquisition 
was unpleasantly negative, but it had an underlying rationale that in retro- 
spect seemed reasonable. 
4.5.5 
Premark’s top management do not view the Florida Tile acquisition as 
a success. Motivated by the possibility of synergies, Premark bought Flor- 
ida Tile only to learn that it did not have as much in common with its 
Clinical Analysis of Postacquisition Outcome 
7. The estimation period runs from 200 to 21 days prior to the first announcement of 
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preexisting businesses as it had anticipated. According to Ringler, “we did 
not know the decorative products business, we  knew laminates.” Wilson 
Plastics had produced  attractive returns for Premark, but  Florida Tile 
“was a laminates company and it served a different market.” In retrospect, 
they felt that Premark had “no skills on the acquisition side, but we acted 
as if we  did. We jumped in and then were stuck. If we  were going to go 
down this road and do acquisitions, we  had to commit more resources 
and more money. We were not an acquisition factory. What we learned is 
that every business is complex in its execution. We had no expertise and 
no synergies.” 
Another problem arose because acquisition decisions were made cen- 
trally at headquarters. Managers of related divisions did not participate 
and their input was not actively sought. This made it unlikely that poten- 
tial synergies, if they existed, would be realized. 
Organizational Design 
After the acquisition, Premark managed Florida Tile as it managed its 
other businesses. Each operating unit had a division president who was 
local. None of Premark’s businesses was in Chicago where Premark was 
headquartered, and there were no operating people in headquarters. The 
division presidents typically reported to the operating executive vice presi- 
dent (then Ringler) who reported to the CEO (then Batts). 
The president of Wilson Plastics was made the group president of Deco- 
rative Products. In this role, he oversaw Wilson Plastics, Hartco, and Flor- 
ida Tile. This was somewhat unusual in that he was both a division presi- 
dent  and  a  group  president.  Ringler  recalled  that  “in  anticipation  of 
Premark’s increased emphasis on decorative products, we  thought about 
moving him up to headquarters from Texas, but he didn’t want to come.” 
To monitor its divisions, Premark had formal quarterly review sessions. 
These were one- or two-day meetings between (1) the division president 
and CFO, and (2)  the corporate CEO, chief  operating  officer (COO), 
CFO, and roughly twelve other corporate staff people. According to Rin- 
gler, “This wasn’t an enjoyable process for anyone, but particularly for the 
division people. A root canal without anesthesia would have been more 
enjoyable. At these meetings we talked about strategic issues, not financial 
performance. It was issue-oriented as opposed to looking at the numbers.” 
Over the course of the year, Ringler also would visit all of the individual 
units. The time Ringler spent at each division “was about proportional to 
the size of and problems at the division.” The distance between Premark 
headquarters and Florida Tile’s operations made it more difficult for Pre- 
mark’s management to know when Florida Tiles was experiencing prob- 
lems. This was particularly important in Premark’s slow response to pro- 
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Compensation and Incentives 
It does not appear that PremarMFlorida Tile took an innovative or 
thoughtful approach to compensation or to capital allocation. According 
to Ringler, “The division presidents were compensated based on financial 
performance that was essentially profit after tax relative to budget. We 
had a few other bells and whistles in there like working capital charges, 
but it boiled down to after tax net income.” In addition, the company de- 
cided which projects to do in the coming year at a two-day strategic bud- 
geting meeting that was attended by corporate and division officers. Again 
according to Ringler, “[Tlhe context of  the company was that we  were 
cash rich and so cash was not a scarce resource that had to be allocated. 
Often we  encouraged division presidents to spend more rather than less. 
We’d ask them, ‘Why don’t you try this or spend on that?”’ Thus, Premark 
did not measure cash flow relative to any cost of capital either in compen- 
sating its executives or in choosing capital projects. 
Informed Operating Performance 
Ringler claims that Florida Tile (and Hartco) never performed well: 
The acquisition momentum turned out to be at corporate and nowhere 
else in the organization. We controlled it, the divisions sat back. No one 
at Wilson Plastics cared about it. We  began to have to manage it out 
of headquarters. 
About a year after the Florida Tile acquisition, we  realized we were 
in trouble. We realized that we had overpaid and that we were not com- 
mitted to ten more acquisitions in decorative products. And that the 
whole idea of a decorative products business didn’t make strategic sense. 
Entry is pretty easy in the tile business. It’s pretty much controlled by 
the Italian tile equipment manufacturers and what they are willing to 
sell. For $20 million to $40 million, you can order the equipment and 
within 12 months have a new state of the art plant up and running. For 
example, take Siam Cement (a Thai company); they did exactly that. 
Also, imports came in to the U.S. market from Mexico, Spain, and Italy. 
In 1992-93  we  realized that Florida Tile was more poorly run than 
we  thought. Then we  fired the president and cleaned house. We  were 
afraid to do anything before that because we  didn’t know the business. 
We thought the management knew what they were doing. As we learned 
more about the business we  became less satisfied with their responses. 
We started to think that they didn’t know what they were doing and we 
knew enough that we felt comfortable with their leaving. Also, although 
Florida Tile has been a problem, it’s a small business and its problems 
quickly got put on the back burner. Especially when Tupperware’s cash 
flow  swamped its monthly losses. When Tuppenvare was  in  trouble, 
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Because Hartco’s performance had deteriorated so badly over the two 
years after we bought it, we almost congratulated ourselves that Florida 
Tile, although it did poorly, didn’t do as horribly. Right now, its perfor- 
mance is about where it was when we bought it.8 
Although this is what management said, analyst reports indicate that 
Florida Tile generated substantially less in operating profits in 1995 than 
the $16 million it generated in the fiscal year ending February 1989. Ac- 
cording to a May 1996 analyst report from Advest Inc., “[Tlhese two ac- 
quisitions (Florida Tile and Hartco) were mistakes in our opinion. Pre- 
mark paid too much for them, they have been largely unprofitable and 
have held back the company’s overall returns. By last year, the two busi- 
nesses had at least reached break-even and we are not presuming they will 
do any better in the foreseeable future.” 
Other Premark Operations 
At about the same time that Premark acquired Florida Tile, its Tup- 
perware and Food Equipment businesses began to experience difficulties. 
By the fiscal year ending December 1990, Tupperware’s operating income 
had declined to $64.9 million from $1 15.7 million in fiscal year 1988, and 
the Food Equipment Group’s had declined to $26.9 million from $57.8 
million. In large part because of these declines, Premark’s stock price fell 
from $30.75 per share at the start of 1990 to $13 per share by the fall of 
1990. Ringler explained: 
The biggest factor behind the decline (at Tupperware) was that Premark 
made two major mistakes. First, we went after the microwave cooking 
product to the exclusion of other products. This was a product intended 
to go from freezer to a 400-degree oven. It worked great, except it shat- 
tered into thousands of pieces when you dropped it. When you offer a 
lifetime guarantee, this poses a real problem. 
Second, we  started a new  distribution program  called Tupperware 
Express which shipped the product directly to the customer. Before we 
started Tupperware Express, orders would be taken at a Tupperware 
party and then ordered from the company by the salesperson. The order 
would be delivered to the hostess who would see that  the order was 
given to the person who  ordered it. Under Tupperware Express, the 
orders would be shipped directly to the customer. We built a $100 mil- 
lion warehouse to handle this program. It worked great for a while. 
Then UPS told us they weren’t making money on delivering our product 
and that they would have to raise the rates $2 to $3 per package. This 
wiped out our profits. The problem was that most people ordering Tup- 
perware didn’t live somewhere that you could just drop off the package 
and not worry about it being stolen. That meant it had to be delivered 
to a person and that meant multiple trips to the home by  UPS. That’s 
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what made it so expensive. Last year [1995] we  pulled out of Tupper- 
ware Express completely. 
Analyst reports at the time bear this out. For example, a report from 
PNC Institutional Investor Service dated  19 December  1989 described 
Tupperware Express and noted that “start-up costs have been high and 
implementation is  running  18 months behind schedule. . . . As a result, 
sales have declined in  markets where the program has been introduced. 
Market research has revealed that dealers have found it difficult to adapt 
to the shift. . . .” 
In  1992, Premark  focused on the three most important businesses it 
owned-Tuppenvare,  Food Equipment, and Wilson Plastics. According 
to Ringler, “the company became better at managing what it had. The 
company stopped making acquisitions and decided to fix what we  had.” 
Premark brought in new presidents to run both Tuppenvare and the Food 
Equipment Group. Premark also eliminated the strategic function at head- 
quarters and reduced headquarters employment from 300 to 150. 
By  1994, Tupperware had recovered, obtaining an operating profit of 
$200 million. In November 1995, Premark announced it was spinning off 
Tuppenvare  to shareholders. Ringler explained  the  reason  behind  the 
spin-off: “We realized that our shareholders were never going to let us do 
anything with the cash but repurchase shares. The market would unleash 
the wrath of God on us if  we  acquired anything with Tupperware’s cash 
flow. We  also felt we were two-thirds of the way up the hill on improving 
the operations of all our businesses. It was like two people at a picnic in a 
sack race. We could each run fine on our own. Why were we each putting 
one of our legs in a bag and trying to run together? It didn’t make sense. 
Also, we  wanted to do it in our own time, not the market’s. We  knew we 
would have to do it eventually. Why not now?” 
It is  worth noting that the Tupperware spin-off immediately reduced 
Premark’s free cash flow problem. By  eliminating the firm’s major source 
of internally generated cash, it imposed a discipline on the remaining busi- 
nesses to become self-sufficient. Ringler believed that Premark would have 
been forced to do the spin-off several years earlier by  the external capital 
markets if  the takeover and junk bond markets had not declined in  the 
early 1990s. 
4.5.6  Traditional Operating Performance 
Table 4.9 presents the traditional accounting performance measures for 
the combination of Premark and Florida Tile from 1986 to 1994. We use 
1989, the last preacquisition fiscal year, as the reference year. We  adjust 
for industry using the median performance of Compustat firms in Florida 
Tile’s primary Compustat SIC code of 3253 and Premark’s primary Com- 
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Table 4.9  Traditional Operating Performance of Florida Tile Acquisition 
EBITDA  EBITDA  EBITDA 
Assets  Sales  Value 
A. Nominal Operating Performance 
Preacquisitiona 
1986  0.138  0.100 
1987  0.136  0.099 
1988  0.170  0.119 
1989  0. I45  0.094 
1990  0.124  0.093 
1991  0.151  0.109 
1992  0.156  0.103 
1993  0.169  0.116 
1994  0.190  0.130 
Postacquisition” 
Average  0.158  0.110 
B. Industry-Adjusted Operating Performance’ 
Preacquisition” 
1986  -0.008  -0.010 
1987  -0.018  -0.007 
1988  0.004  0.012 
1989  0.032  0.018 
1990  0.007  0.005 
1991  0.056  0.024 
1992  0.021  -0.003 
1993  0.030  -0.001 
1994  0.031  0.003 






















Note:  Changes and  industry-adjusted changes  in  operating income  before depreciation 
(EBITDA) to sales, assets, and value for Premark’s acquisition of Florida Tile. 
‘Preacquisition  performance is measured by  combining the performance of Premark and 
Florida Tile. Postacquisition performance is measured based on data from Premark’s finan- 
cial statements. 
bIndustry-adjusted  performance based on median performance of firms in Premark’s and 
Florida Tile’s Compustat primary four-digit SIC code. 
appropriate relative amount of Florida Tile and Premark assets, sales, or 
value. Again, the industry-adjusted results are qualitatively similar using 
industry and size-matched control firms. 
Despite the fact that the acquisition of Florida Tile was not successful, 
panel A of table 4.9 indicates that all three measures using EBITDA ex- 
ceed their 1989 values from 1991 onward. Adjusting for industry, panel B 
finds essentially no postacquisition change in performance. In contrast to 
the Cooper Cameron acquisition  where the EBITDA to value measure 
was the only one that tracked the acquisition  success by  declining, the 
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It also is worth looking more closely at the patterns generated by deflat- 
ing by the market value of a firm’s capital. This method shows a substan- 
tial improvement in Premark’s performance in 1991 as EBITDA to value 
increases from 0.179 to 0.260 (unadjusted for industry) and from 0.049 to 
0.143 (adjusted for industry). The method then shows a substantial decline 
in 1994, when the ratio declines to 0.155 and 0.014 (unadjusted and ad- 
justed for industry). The explanation for this pattern is straightforward. 
Operating performance appears to improve because Premark’s stock price 
declines substantially and  the  denominator declines  substantially. Op- 
erating performance appears to decline because Premark’s stock price in- 
creases substantially and the denominator  increases substantially. This 
pattern suggests that the measure of operating performance developed in 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) may  be  inappropriate for evaluating 
acquisition success. 
4.5.7  Longer-Term Stock Performance 
Figure 4.4 details the performance of Premark’s stock versus the S&P 
500 and an equal-weighted index of firms in Compustat with Premark’s 
primary SIC code (3089). The chart indicates that Premark’s stock de- 
clined substantially from late 1989 to late 1990 as the difficulties at Tupper- 
ware became apparent. From late 1990 to the end of 1995, as the company 
fixed the problems at Tuppenvare, Premark’s stock improved substantially, 
increasing by  more than a factor of  seven (with dividends reinvested). 
+  S&P  500 Index 
6.00 1  rzl  +Industry  (SIC3089) 
861124  871130  881130  891130  901130  911129  921130  931130  941130  951130 
oaa 
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Premark’s stock performance from the acquisition through  1995 is  sub- 
stantially better than that of the S&P 500 and approximately the same as 
the industry. 
4.5.8 
Based on our analysis and conversations with Premark  top manage- 
ment, we  conclude that  Premark’s acquisition of  Florida Tile reduced 
value overall and to Premark’s shareholders, consistent with the market’s 
initial assessment. We think that Premark’s experience illustrates the pres- 
sures excess cash flow places on top managers and the difficulties in using 
that cash flow to make successful acquisitions in unrelated businesses. Par- 
tially because the company had no focused acquisition strategy, Premark 
overpaid for a target firm that had no synergies with its existing businesses. 
Furthermore, shortly after the Florida Tile acquisition, Tupperware’s 
performance began to deteriorate. Management turned  its attention to- 
ward resolving problems in that business, and only when those problems 
were resolved did they have the time to devote to problems at Florida Tile. 
Summary of Sources of Value Creation and Destruction 
4.6  Discussion and Implications 
While our findings are based  on only two acquisitions, they  suggest 
three hypotheses or conclusions concerning the determinants of acqui- 
sition  success or failure. These  analyses and  hypotheses illustrate the 
strengths of clinical research in that large sample studies have been rela- 
tively  silent on this important issue. Given the limited research on what 
organizations do following acquisitions, we  also believe that our hypothe- 
ses can serve as a guide to developing large sample studies of those deter- 
minants. 
First, it is important for an acquirer to have a deep understanding of 
the target’s business and industry when the acquirer begins to negotiate. 
While it seems obvious that an acquirer should know its target well, the 
facts suggest this is often not the case. In both acquisitions we studied, the 
managers of the acquirers based their acquisition decisions on potential 
synergies that  never materialized. Premark  did not understand  Florida 
Tile nor, surprisingly, did Cooper understand Cameron. 
A possible challenge to this hypothesis is that it relies on hindsight, that 
it is not obvious whether the acquirers could have known more ex ante. 
For example, in Cooper’s acquisition of Cameron, perhaps it was reason- 
able ex ante for Cooper to acquire Cameron and attempt to “Cooperize” 
it. According to this view, the outcome was a surprise. While we  cannot 
reject this view with certainty, we believe it is implausible. It should have 
been clear that Cameron’s products and markets were substantially differ- 
ent from those of Cooper. And even if this was not clear at the time of the 
acquisition, it is  difficult to understand  why  the problems progressed to Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions  225 
become as severe as they did following the acquisition. Furthermore, at 
the time of the acquisition, Cameron’s managers and some financial ana- 
lysts knew that Cameron had spent the last decade reducing costs. Thus, 
Cooperization-type measures were an unlikely source of postacquisition 
value creation. In our view, it seems likely that more careful and intensive 
research, including a willingness to critically test the potential for synerg- 
ies, would help acquirers avoid bad ~utcomes.~ 
Our findings also suggest that measures of relatedness based on SIC 
codes are poor measures of an acquirer’s understanding of a target’s busi- 
nesses. Future research would do well to develop better measures to reflect 
that under standing. 
Second, organizational design and structures are important sources of 
value in acquisitions. For Cooper Industries, appropriate design and struc- 
ture was probably a source of value creation in early acquisitions while 
inappropriate design was  a source of value destruction in the Cameron 
acquisition. Although not fully developed in this paper, we  suspect that 
organizational design and structure issues are highly related to corporate 
culture and its influence on decisionmaking. Indeed, we  believe that an 
acquirer should analyze the organizational design not only of the target 
but also of itself in light of the changes that a particular acquisition may 
bring. Future research would be strengthened by the development of mea- 
sures of the extent to which the acquirer places the appropriate organiza- 
tional structure on the target and the combined company. 
Third, incentives matter a great deal in determining the success of an 
acquisition. Neither Cooper nor Premark utilized high-powered incentives 
after their acquisitions. In contrast, after the split-off, Cooper Cameron 
introduced  high-powered incentives-equity-based  and EBITDA-based 
compensation-and  experienced substantial performance improvements. 
This suggests that such incentives were particularly appropriate for Cam- 
eron. Future research that studies postacquisition incentives would be of 
great interest and value. 
The second and third hypotheses in the context of Cooper and Cameron 
suggest an additional question or puzzle. By  1995, the management of 
Cooper Industries recognized the problems at Cameron and hired Erikson 
(and Hix) to repair them. Despite this recognition, Cooper decided to split 
off Cameron (and Cooper Energy Services) as a separate entity rather than 
keep them as divisions of Cooper. But why  could Erikson not have run 
Cameron under Cooper’s ownership, changed the organizational design, 
and introduced high-powered incentives? We  suspect that the answer to 
this question will inform the debate on the costs and benefits of corporate 
diversification and focus. 
9. Anecdotally, we have heard this recommendation in conversations with senior consul- 
tants at several consulting firms. We also are personally aware of a number of other acquisi- 
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Comment  G. William Schwert 
Introduction 
My understanding is that the theme of this NBER conference is to study 
a small number of acquisitions intensively with the goal of developing new 
insights into the market for corporate control. By interviewing managers, 
examining internal corporate records, and otherwise focusing attention on 
the details of a few transactions, we hope to learn the reasons why bidders 
are willing to pay large premiums to acquire target firms and whether their 
expectations at the time of the transaction  are borne out by  subsequent 
performance. One goal of this research is to develop hypotheses, methods, 
or data that  could be  applied to larger scale empirical analyses of the 
corporate control market. The goals for this conference are similar to the 
motivation for the Clinical Studies section of the Journal of  Financial Eco- 
nomics,  pioneered by Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback in 1989 (Jensen 
et al. 1989). 
From this perspective, clinical studies are a good example of inductive 
inference, which is defined by Jeffreys (1 961, 1) as “making inferences from 
past experience to predict future experience.” Zellner (1971, 5) describes 
reductive inference as a process whereby science develops new hypotheses: 
“unusual and surprising facts often trigger the reductive process to pro- 
duce new concepts and generalizations.” Perhaps in some circumstances 
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we  will  observe phenomena in detailed clinical studies that cause us to 
postulate new theories or hypotheses about economic behavior. 
What Is Success or Failure in Mergers and Acquisitions? 
Large  sample studies have  frequently  shown  substantial  changes  in 
wealth for stockholders of  target  and (sometimes) bidder  firms. These 
changes are usually measured around the announcement of the first public 
bid. Targets generally benefit, bidders often lose, but the net gains are usu- 
ally positive, so the target gains are not just overpayment by the bidder. Fig- 
ure 4C. I shows the distribution of takeover premiums for 2,003 exchange- 
listed targets and 1,110 exchange-listed bidders from  1975 to 1994. The 
premiums are measured as market-model adjusted stock returns accumu- 
lated from three months before to six months after the first bid announce- 
ment (similar to the method used in many papers that study takeovers, 
including Schwert 1996). The average premiums are 23.7 percent for tar- 
gets and 0.6 percent for bidders, with standard deviations of 43.0 percent 
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many realized premiums are negative. Figure 4C. 1 also shows normal dis- 
tributions with the same means and standard deviations represented as 
dotted and dashed curves. These approximate the histograms of target and 
bidder premiums well. 
The message that I get from figure 4C.1 is that there is a lot of “noise” 
in the cross-sectional distribution of premiums. Focusing on differences in 
average premiums can miss the point that there are many idiosyncratic dif- 
ferences across cases. Of course, the other side of this argument is that any 
small sample of cases is not likely to be representative of the complex popu- 
lation represented in the figure. 
Kaplan,  Mitchell,  and  Wruck  looked  at  one  deal  that  the  market 
thought would be  profitable and one that the market thought would be 
unprofitable. They focused on exchange-listed nonfinancial firms that com- 
pleted deals from 1987 to 1994. Ex ante success was defined as an eleven- 
day abnormal return greater than 5 percent, while failure was defined as 
an eleven-day abnormal return less than 0 percent, based on a weighted 
average of  announcement  returns  for targets and bidders, using equity 
capitalization as weights. There were thirty-four possible successes and 
fourteen possible failures. Next, they looked for cases where personal or 
institutional contacts or geographic proximity made it more likely  that 
management would share private information. They pursued four firms as 
possible candidates and received favorable responses from two initially, 
although one later withdrew support. 
Selection Biases 
Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck point  out several biases that cause the 
selection of cases for detailed clinical study to be  nonrandom. Selection 
biases may be (1) performance-related, in which case firms that experience 
poor  performance  are less likely  to want  to publicize their  story;  (2) 
privacy-related, where  the  choice of  nondisclosure policies by  firms is 
probably not random but is likely to be related to the value of information 
about the firm’s investment opportunities; or (3) institution-related, where 
the question may be asked whether, if  personal or institutional contacts 
are necessary to conduct clinical research, this somehow slants the results. 
Is there an incentive to pull punches in describing corporate behavior to 
increase the likelihood of access to other companies in the future? All of 
these factors could limit the generalizability of clinical analysis and they 
are likely to be important in any clinical study. 
There is evidence in the authors’ paper that managers are reluctant to 
criticize themselves. Most of the information about poor performance of 
Cooper comes from Cooper Cameron managers after they had been spun 
off  from Cooper, and even they are reluctant to seem critical of former 
colleagues. Premark withdrew its cooperation early in the project, forcing 
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rather than management interviews and internal  records, to enrich the 
analysis of the Premark-Florida  Tile transaction. 
Confounding Events 
In measuring the ex post performance of these transactions, the authors 
track accounting and stock price performance for many years after the 
deal was announced. An obvious difficulty, which they discuss in detail, is 
to abstract from the many other factors that influence the performance of 
the merged firm. 
Besides acquiring Cameron Iron Works, Cooper also took over Cham- 
pion Products in 1989. This was part of a strategy of acquisitions that be- 
gan in the  1960s. In fact, this strategy, called “Cooperization,” is  often 
taught in  strategy courses using Harvard cases (Collis 1991; Collis and 
Stuart 1991). Thus, the success or failure of the Cameron acquisition has 
to be viewed in the context of  a long-term strategy that involved many 
acquisitions. In July  1995, Cooper spun off Cameron. Kaplan, Mitchell, 
and Wruck point  out that Cooper Cameron increased focus, decreased 
bureaucracy, and  increased incentive compensation  after  it  split from 
Cooper’s control. The authors argue that Cooper Cameron has been much 
more successful than Cameron was as a wholly owned subsidiary inside a 
highly bureaucratic Cooper organization. 
In Premark’s acquisition of  Florida Tile, the authors argue that Pre- 
mark was spending the cash generated by  its Tupperware division to fi- 
nance the acquisition in 1990. Shortly afterward, the Tupperware market 
was adversely affected by factors unrelated to the acquisition. The authors 
argue that solving the Tupperware problem probably distracted Premark 
management from focusing on Florida Tile, which contributed to the fail- 
ure of this transaction. 
Ex Ante Profitability-Stock  Market Reaction to Bids 
Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck use the initial stock market reaction as a 
measure of  whether  the transaction  was  likely  to be  successful. I have 
much sympathy with this approach, but there are also some potential limi- 
tations. As noted by the authors, part of the change in the bidder’s stock 
price can be a reaction to information about the bidder’s alternative uses 
for capital. For example, the Florida Tile transaction might have been a 
neutral deal for Premark (i.e., it could have been a zero net present value 
investment), but if the market had expected a better alternative, Premark’s 
stock price would fall. 
As another example, the  strong negative reaction to Kodak’s “white 
knight” takeover of Sterling Drug in 1988 was likely to be more than over- 
payment  because  the  loss in  value  for  Kodak  exceeded  the  premium 
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something negative about the future profitability of Kodak’s main line of 
business (chemical photography) from the eagerness with which Kodak 
pursued Sterling. 
Thus, the use of initial stock market reaction as a basis for identifying 
successful or unsuccessful deals has some difficulties. 
Ex Post Profitability-Stock  and Accounting Returns 
Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck measure profitability after the deal using 
both accounting and stock returns. Accounting returns (EBITDA relative 
to sales, assets, and value) based on private data show poor performance 
for the Cameron division in table 4.3. In contrast, the public data based 
on the consolidated performance of Cooper hide the poor performance of 
Cameron in table 4.4. This is an important example where the methods of 
clinical studies, including access to internal records and information from 
companies, provides substantially different information from the publicly 
available data. 
Nevertheless, the problem of identifying abnormal accounting perfor- 
mance over long time periods is difficult. Barber and Lyon (1 996) provide 
simulation evidence that shows the difficulties and imprecision associated 
with testing for unusual accounting performance. 
A similar problem arises in measuring abnormal stock returns over long 
time periods. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) 
use different simulation methods to show the difficulties and imprecision 
associated with testing for unusual stock price performance. Mitchell and 
Stafford (1998) also show the wide dispersion of abnormal stock return 
measures when calculated over multiyear horizons. 
The linkage between the expected net benefits from an acquisition based 
on announcement period stock returns and the realized benefits based on 
accounting performance is likely to be weak, simply because there is much 
noise in both measures. If the correlation is small, it would be difficult to 
measure in a large sample of cases. It would be unlikely to see a relation 
between these measures in a small sample of cases (e.g., two), except by 
chance. 
Finally, in an efficient market one would not expect a correlation be- 
tween the abnormal stock return at the time of the acquisition announce- 
ment and the abnormal return measured over subsequent periods. Thus, 
if the Cooper and Premark stock returns are disappointing after the acqui- 
sitions, this can be viewed as a reflection of new negative information, but 
not as confirmation or contradiction  of initial market reactions (to the 
extent that markets are efficient). This point is  worth reiterating, not so 
much because Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck interpret it incorrectly, but 
because much of the discussion at the conference for many of the papers 
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Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
The authors conclude that both of these deals failed. Cooper’s acquisi- 
tion of  Cameron failed because they were in a different business (despite 
SIC  code  similarities) and  because  Cooper’s  centralized  organization 
and incentives were inappropriate. Premark’s acquisition of Florida Tile 
failed because they were  in different businesses, because Premark over- 
paid (spending free cash flow), and because other divisions had problems. 
One lesson the authors advocate is that bidders must understand their 
targets. It is hard to argue with this conclusion, but it is also hard to imple- 
ment it. It seems clear that SIC codes are not helpful, because different 
sources at different times yield different answers. On the other hand, no 
suggestions are offered for alternative methods of identifying target com- 
panies that are similar to the bidders. 
Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck argue that organizational design or cor- 
porate cultures are important, but they offer few guidelines for identifying 
problems. The challenge here is to develop a measurable, implementable, 
replicable method that could be used in large samples. 
The authors also argue that incentives are important. They point  to 
the “high powered” equity incentives used by  Cooper Cameron after the 
spinoff, but not by  Cooper or Premark. On the other hand, my  sense is 
that this is typical of the distinction between “focus-increasing’’ going pri- 
vate or recapitalization transactions versus acquisitions. I doubt that Kap- 
lan, Mitchell, and Wruck would conclude that acquisitions would fail un- 
less such incentive compensation is part of the transaction. 
Another question that concerns many of the clinical studies in this con- 
ference was whether bidding firms were making mistakes. Roll (1986) hy- 
pothesizes that managers often become carried away with the bidding pro- 
cess and overpay. Jensen (1986) argues that firms with abundant free cash 
flow often waste it, perhaps by  overpaying in acquisitions. From this per- 
spective, negative stock price reactions for bidders could reflect systematic 
free cash flow mistakes that are recognized by  the outside world at the 
time. This raises the question of whether managers have better informa- 
tion about the likely success of a possible acquisition than security ana- 
lysts. It would be interesting to augment the retrospective analysis by man- 
agers with reports of securities analysts (or other disinterested parties) at 
the time of the transaction. This would give clinical studies an additional 
dimension of information beyond the usual public databases without the 
problem of  translating through the “20/20 hindsight” of managers who 
were involved in the transaction. Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions  233 
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Comment  Rene M. Stulz 
The paper by Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck provides an extremely detailed 
and careful analysis of two acquisitions, Cooper Industries’ acquisition of 
Cameron Iron Works in 1989 and Premark’s acquisition of Florida Tile in 
1990. The paper argues that neither acquisition was successful in creating 
value. The lack of value creation is attributed to several causes, but one 
surprising conclusion is that the managers of the acquiring companies did 
not understand  the characteristics of  the target well.  The other reasons 
uncovered by the authors for the lack of success of the acquisitions are 
more commonly emphasized in the literature. They are the inappropriate 
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incentives of managers and the poor organizational design of the merged 
firms. 
In this discussion, I address three issues in turn. First, I consider the 
difficulty in assessing whether a specific acquisition decision was the right 
one as opposed to whether acquisitions in general create wealth. Second, 
I argue that the difficulties documented in the study may have more to do 
with growth through diversification in general than with acquisitions per 
se. Third, I point out that we cannot judge the shareholder wealth impact 
of a business strategy without  knowing what management would  have 
done instead. 
What Can We  Learn from a Sample of Two? 
Over recent years, there has been renewed interest in studies that em- 
phasize the institutional context of business activities. Typically, such stud- 
ies are limited to small samples when proper care is taken to understand 
the institutional  context. An  analysis based  on few  data points cannot 
draw on the formal statistical tools available for hypothesis testing in large 
sample studies. As a result, interpreting the evidence of small sample stud- 
ies is particularly difficult. This problem is quite clear in the context of 
this study. The authors find that both acquisitions failed. The important 
question they would like to answer, however, is whether these acquisitions 
were positive net present value projects for the firms that undertook them. 
In other words, were these acquisitions failures ex  ante or good acquisi- 
tions that failed because bad things happened? In a large scale study of 
takeovers, the idiosyncrasies of individual takeovers average out and the 
net effect of takeovers should be positive for shareholders if takeovers cre- 
ate wealth in general. Yet, it would be perfectly possible for some individ- 
ual takeovers to have bad outcomes when all takeovers are positive net 
present value projects when undertaken. The number of bad outcomes in 
a large scale study would help us assess the hypothesis we  are trying to 
test. Here, we  have  bad outcomes but do not know whether they result 
from acquisitions that would have destroyed wealth if they worked out as 
expected. If the outcome of a takeover is the expected value creation of the 
takeover plus random noise that is the product of idiosyncrasies specific to 
that particular takeover, we  cannot separate the noise from the expected 
value creation with two observations and hence cannot tell whether the 
expected value creation is positive or not. Takeovers are bad for share- 
holders in general only if the expected value creation is negative. 
The authors make a gallant effort to convince the reader that the acqui- 
sitions were poor ones ex ante. Their arguments are persuasive, but their 
information differs from the information that was available to manage- 
ment when it decided to make the acquisition. Once one knows that an 
acquisition has been unsuccessful, it is only natural to look for possible 
explanations of failure and uncover issues that management neglected or Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions  235 
misunderstood. Here, it would appear that an ex ante source of failure is 
that management did not know enough about the target. Again, this may 
be true, but how do we  know that management made its decision ineffi- 
ciently? There are many demands on management’s time and, in the case 
of these acquisitions, management may have felt that it had enough infor- 
mation to make its decision. Obviously it was surprised after the acquisi- 
tion when it discovered some unexpected target attributes. Based on two 
observations, it is difficult to understand what these surprises imply. Sup- 
pose that  managers always allocate the same amount of  time to make 
acquisition decisions. To place the surprises observed in these two acquisi- 
tions in context, we would have to know how often such surprises occur. 
If  they occur rarely,  then  management  is  probably spending the  right 
amount of  time on acquisitions. If they happen  often, then one has to 
wonder about the incentives of managers to make decisions with insuffi- 
cient information. 
While it is difficult to calculate generally what to make out of two data 
points, it should be stressed that these two data points are the basis for a 
study that is extremely useful in at least two ways. First, it should be re- 
quired reading for students because it shows precisely what can happen in 
acquisitions and how problems could be avoided. There is no way that a 
large scale study could be as informative for a manager-to-be. A manager 
does not worry whether acquisitions in general create wealth but wants to 
know how to ensure that the next acquisition she makes fulfills her objec- 
tives. If the manager’s objective is to create wealth, then she wants to know 
how to make it more likely that this will happen. Second, this study should 
lead researchers to address some questions that they have not addressed 
in large scale studies. The existing literature has documented that many 
takeovers fail, but  a systematic investigation of  why  they fail and how 
prevalent failure is should be conducted; this paper shows what such an 
investigation should focus on. 
Why the Failure? 
Why did these acquisitions fail? One can think of two different explana- 
tions that have dramatically different implications for the theory of  the 
firm. The first possible explanation is that it is always difficult to integrate 
the activities of two firms, so that in general it is difficult to make acquisi- 
tions work. In other words, acquisitions could be positive net  present 
value projects, but they would have a high rate of failure because they are 
difficult to carry out. The difficulty with this hypothesis is that in the case 
of  the acquisition of  Cameron, the acquisition seems to have destroyed 
value of Cameron as a stand-alone firm. Hence, it is not as if nothing was 
added by  the takeover and the gains of  the potential combination were 
not realized. The evidence suggests that what happened is that something 
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a substantial fraction of the premerger value of Cameron. This means that 
the value destroyed is much larger than the synergy that did not happen. 
The evidence in the study is quite consistent with the alternative expla- 
nation that the acquisitions did not work out because diversification and 
growth through diversification destroy wealth on average. As evidenced in 
the literature, diversified firms are valued less than comparable portfolios 
of specialized firms. Here, the targets lost value being part of a larger firm 
because their management did not have the appropriate incentives and the 
more complex organization was not as nimble in reacting to changes in 
investment opportunities. Viewed from this perspective, it is not clear that 
it is important that Cameron and Florida Tile were acquired. Had these 
divisions been grown internally, value would still have been lost because 
the same problems would have been present. Acquiring these divisions 
was more costly for the shareholders of the acquirers than internal growth 
because they paid a premium. However, at the level of the economy as a 
whole, this premium does not correspond to value destruction but rather 
to value transfer. 
If what destroys value is growth through diversification, acquisitions are 
just an easy way to implement a strategy of growth through diversification. 
If acquisitions were not feasible, management would still engage in growth 
through diversification and value would still be destroyed if the incentives 
that  lead  management  to  choose  such  business  strategies  remain  un- 
changed. These considerations make it even harder to assess the two take- 
overs discussed in this study. In both firms, management had resources 
to grow the firm but lacked investment opportunities in the existing core 
business. The best outcome from the perspective of shareholders would 
have been for management to pay  out these resources to shareholders. 
Management did not want to do that because it would have been an ad- 
mission of failure or because management felt that it could do better for 
the shareholders. Had therefore management not been allowed to make 
acquisitions, it is not at all clear that shareholders would have been better 
off. What if, instead, management had chosen to invest in core activities? 
It might be that more corporate resources would have been wasted that 
way. This problem suggests a difficulty with many studies that assess take- 
overs. If takeovers that do not create wealth are undertaken by  manage- 
ment, the proper comparison of the gains and losses of takeovers is not 
with what management would do if it maximized shareholder wealth but 
rather with what it would do if it did not undertake the takeover being con- 
sidered. 
While it is true that the acquisitions of Cameron and Florida Tile de- 
stroyed wealth, they might have accomplished management’s objectives 
of growth through diversification at lower cost to shareholders than the 
alternatives management was contemplating. Hence, when the market re- 
acts to acquisitions, it is quite difficult to know how to interpret the stock Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions  237 
price reaction. If management maximizes shareholder wealth, acquisitions 
that have negative announcement returns are either managerial mistakes 
or acquisitions that reveal information about the acquirer that the market 
did not have. If  management pursues its own objectives and the market 
knows these objectives, an acquisition with a negative announcement re- 
turn reveals that management destroyed more wealth than expected. In 
this case, acquisitions with no abnormal returns for the acquirer could still 
destroy wealth because the wealth destruction is anticipated. 
Based on the considerations just discussed, one should be quite cautious 
in  evaluating announcement  abnormal  returns  associated with  single 
transactions. The authors chose their sample by selecting one acquisition 
with a positive abnormal return and one with a negative abnormal return. 
Our discussion suggests that such a strategy would yield a sample of one 
positive net present value and one negative net present value acquisition 
only if managers maximize shareholder wealth and if the abnormal returns 
of acquisitions only reveal information about whether management made 
the right or wrong decision. If these assumptions are not met, a positive 
net present value takeover could have a negative abnormal return because 
it reveals adverse information about the bidder’s investment opportunities, 
and a negative net present value takeover could have a positive abnormal 
return because its managers wasted less shareholder wealth than expected. 
Conclusion 
This study and the other papers in the volume show how little we know 
about takeovers and about managerial incentives. Why is it that managers 
make all these acquisitions when so few of them appear to be successful? 
Here we  have authors who initially sought to discuss successful acquisi- 
tions only to find, after all was said and done, that the acquisitions were 
not successful. If successful acquisitions are so hard to find, why is it that 
shareholders approve mergers as often as they do? This Page Intentionally Left Blank